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ACTIVE AVOIDANCE: THE MODERN SUPREME COURT
AND LEGAL CHANGE
Neal Kumar Katyal∗ & Thomas P. Schmidt∗∗
The Supreme Court in the last few years has resolved some of the most divisive and
consequential cases before it by employing the same maneuver: construing statutes to
avoid constitutional difficulty. Although the Court generally justifies the avoidance
canon as a form of judicial restraint, these recent decisions have used the canon to
camouflage acts of judicial aggression in both the statutory and constitutional spheres.
In particular, the Court has adopted dubious readings of federal statutes that would have
been unthinkable in the canon’s absence. We call this move the “rewriting power.” The
canon has also been used to articulate new constitutional norms and significant breaks
from settled doctrine. We call this move “generative avoidance.” Both practices are
facets of the broader phenomenon of “active avoidance,” which is the use of the
avoidance canon to usher in legal change.
This Article defines and critiques active avoidance by analyzing in detail two recent
instances — Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder and
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) — as well as providing
a briefer analysis of Bond v. United States. In Northwest Austin, the Court rewrote the
bailout provision of the Voting Rights Act and gave birth to the “equal sovereignty”
doctrine. In NFIB, the Court construed away a constitutional problem with the individual mandate and gave birth to what we call the “antinovelty doctrine”: the principle
that statutes without historical precedent are constitutionally suspect. The Article
demonstrates that the rewriting power can have a countermajoritarian effect equal to —
or even greater than — outright invalidation, because of certain features of our
legislative process. And it shows how generative avoidance, by undermining some of the
structural guarantors of judicial restraint, may encourage the Court to spearhead
constitutional change. For these reasons, this Article sounds a cautionary note about
the recent judicial temptation to use the avoidance canon. The Article concludes by
offering a defense of a properly limited avoidance canon.

INTRODUCTION

I

n the last few years, the Supreme Court has resolved some of the
most divisive and consequential cases before it with the same maneuver: construing statutes to avoid constitutional difficulty.1 Recent
Terms feature several high-profile examples. In National Federation
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Paul and Patricia Saunders Professor of National Security Law, Georgetown University
Law Center.
∗∗ Visiting Researcher, Georgetown University Law Center. The authors wish to thank Akhil
Amar, Harold Edgar, Joshua Geltzer, Jeremy Kessler, David Pozen, Brian Richardson, Zachary
Schauf, Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Michael Schmidt, the participants in the Georgetown Faculty
Workshop, and the editors of the Harvard Law Review for their helpful suggestions. Jonathan
Silberman and Zoe Jacoby provided excellent research assistance.
1 Others have discussed the use of the avoidance canon in the Roberts Court. See Neal
Devins, Constitutional Avoidance and the Roberts Court, 32 U. DAYTON L. REV. 339 (2007);
Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts Court, 2009 SUP.
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of Independent Business v. Sebelius2 (NFIB), for instance, Chief Justice Roberts first found the Affordable Care Act3 unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, only to pivot and (largely) uphold the Act
under the separate constitutional power of taxation.4 Upholding the
Act required abandoning the “more natural[]” reading of it, as the
Chief Justice gently phrased it, but he was not troubled, invoking the
Court’s “duty to construe a statute to save it.”5
Presumably he was so untroubled because that move has become
so familiar. In another major decision in 2009, the Court (in an opinion by Chief Justice Roberts) upheld the constitutionality of Section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 19656 by construing a separate part — the
so-called “bailout” provision7 — to permit covered jurisdictions (like
the local utility that was a plaintiff in the case) to terminate their covered status.8 The Court justified this otherwise indefensible reading
with the avoidance canon, opining along the way that the Act’s constitutionality was in doubt because of the constitutional command to
treat States equally — without ever quite explaining the source or
scope of that command.9 As we all know now, the Court used this
new constitutional doctrine of state equality a few years later to gut a
key part of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County v. Holder.10
What happened in Shelby County was not an anomaly. It was, rather, a predictable consequence of the way that the canon of constitutional avoidance is being conceptualized and deployed today. Though

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
CT. REV. 181. Professor Neal Devins argues that the Roberts Court “need not make extensive use
of constitutional avoidance,” Devins, supra, at 339, because Congress is “less engaged in constitutional matters” and seems less “poised to strike back at the Court” than it has been in the past, id.
at 345. Professor Richard Hasen explores inconsistencies in the Roberts Court’s applications of
the canon. Professor Richard Re has also written a short, incisive piece on the Roberts Court’s
tendency to signal legal change before actually following through with it, and “active avoidance”
could be seen as an instance of that broader tendency. See Richard M. Re, The Doctrine of One
Last Chance, 17 GREEN BAG 2D 173, 182 (2014). Our focus is different from these prior efforts:
we use recent avoidance decisions by the Roberts Court to assess and critique the avoidance canon more generally.
2 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
3 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
4 132 S. Ct. at 2600.
5 Id.
6 52 U.S.C.A. §§ 10101–10702 (West 2014) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437).
7 Id. § 10303(a).
8 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). Disclosure: One of the
authors argued Northwest Austin in the Supreme Court and the health care case in the Courts of
Appeals for the Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits on behalf of the United States.
9 See id. at 203.
10 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
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it originated as a “cardinal principle” of judicial self-restraint,11 the socalled “avoidance” canon now camouflages acts of judicial aggression
in both the constitutional and statutory spheres. This aggression
comes in two forms. First, the Court has used avoidance cases to announce new rules of constitutional law and major departures from settled doctrine. We call this move “generative” avoidance. Indeed, in
NFIB, the canon enabled the Court to launch a radical principle —
that statutes without historical precedent are constitutionally suspect.12
Second, the Court seems indifferent to whether the resulting statutory
interpretations are at all plausible. The canon has thus in practice
morphed into a twisted corollary: a court should not strike down a law
if it can be judicially rewritten to avoid constitutional difficulty. We
call this move the “rewriting power.” Generative avoidance and the
rewriting power are two facets of a phenomenon that we call active
avoidance — using the avoidance canon to usher in legal change.
Active avoidance — despite the rhetorical dressing that often clings
to it — is anything but a “cardinal principle” of judicial restraint. It
leads to tortured constructions of statutes that bear little resemblance
to laws actually passed by the elected branches. Such judicially rewritten laws can be nearly impossible to change by legislative action.
In addition, avoidance leads to — even requires — sloppy and cursory
constitutional reasoning. Instead of encouraging judges to carefully
limit the zone of unconstitutionality, which defines the space in which
the elected branches may not operate, avoidance often leaves legislators in the dark. The avoidance canon requires only that a judge advert to some theoretical “doubt” about a law’s constitutionality, which
naturally leads to vague and imprecise constitutional analysis. Further, the canon allows judges to articulate constitutional principles in a
context where the real impact of those principles — the invalidation of
a law — will be unfelt. The statute by definition will survive, even if
in distorted form. This deferral of consequences is anomalous in a
case-or-controversy legal system that (ostensibly) abhors advisory opinions; the deferral of consequences may also embolden the Court to
spearhead constitutional change.
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder13 is
a prime example of both problems. Without the avoidance canon, the
Court’s interpretation of the bailout provision of the Voting Rights Act
was indefensible. Even with the canon, none of the litigants seriously
thought that the statutory arguments had a chance — they were that
weak. But the Court adopted that implausible reading nonetheless,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
11 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
12 See infra section II.B.2, pp. 2139–49.
13 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
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and in the course of doing so created a constitutional principle that has
come to be called the “equal sovereignty” doctrine. The Court, however, did not have to fully ventilate and explain its new “equal sovereignty” doctrine because it was not used to invalidate the Voting Rights
Act. The Court did not explain the underlying source of the principle — textual, structural, or otherwise. All the Court had to do was
gesture toward a possible constitutional problem, and so it pointed to a
line of cases requiring that new states be admitted to the Union on
equal terms. Yet the Court never explained how or why it could ignore the fact that those cases had been expressly limited to state equality at the time the States were admitted to the Union, and did not
reach their subsequent treatment. Moreover, the Court never grappled
with the Reconstruction Amendments, whose purpose, in significant
part, was to limit state sovereignty in the name of racial equality.
NFIB is vulnerable to similar criticisms. The Chief Justice’s pronouncements regarding the Commerce Clause did not matter at all to
the outcome of the case. Invoking avoidance, the Court upheld the
Act on an entirely separate ground.14 But, as in Northwest Austin, its
digression yielded a new constitutional principle with potentially large
ramifications — the Court suspended the presumption of constitutionality for statutes that lack historical precedent. This “antinovelty doctrine,” as we call it, is alien to the text, history, and structure of the
Constitution. It is at odds with McCulloch v. Maryland.15 And it
makes a strange pair with the rewriting power: the antinovelty doctrine sees newness as an argument for invalidation, yet the rewriting
power results in statutes that are so unprecedented they have literally
never even been enacted.
Our purpose here is not to take sides on the merits of these constitutional issues. Something more basic is afoot. The avoidance canon
developed in large part to alleviate the countermajoritarian difficulty — the problem of unelected judges undoing the work of elected legislators.16 But in some circumstances the rewriting power can be even
more antidemocratic than outright invalidation, by putting in place a
law that Congress did not want and that, because of various inertial
forces laced into our constitutional system, Congress will not be able to
change.
Moreover, when avoidance is employed in a generative manner, the
problems multiply. One key structural limitation on the judicial power
is that constitutional reasoning is moored to a specific case. Legal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 The Chief Justice argued that he would not have reached that alternate ground if not for his
Commerce Clause holding. We explain why that explanation is unpersuasive below. See infra
pp. 2137–38.
15 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16 See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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principles are sharpened by concrete application; abstraction is curbed
by context. This is one of the oldest principles of common law adjudication. Indeed, Article III’s circumscription of the “judicial power” is
grounded in the belief that the clash of legal arguments that are outcome determinative in a particular “Case” will generate better — and
more limited — decisionmaking. But generative avoidance allows
courts to evade, or at least soften, that structural limitation on the judicial power. That is because the Court does not have to fully face the
impact of its constitutional reasoning when a challenged statute is ultimately upheld. The elaboration of a constitutional principle is mostly costless in that “Case.”
The result is constitutional adventurism of a uniquely pernicious
sort. Avoidance decisions profess a Brandeisian reticence about the
judicial power, which (along with the fact that a statute is nominally
upheld) allows the Court to renovate the Constitution with less visibility. The Court can thus proceed in the guise of judicial restraint.
When the canon is deployed in the generative manner of Northwest
Austin or NFIB, there is a mismatch between the rhetoric of restraint
and the reality of constitutional aggression.
To be fair to the Court, this “aggression” is likely not self-conscious;
it may be driven simply by the desire to have narrower rulings and
greater unanimity — both of which are laudable goals.17 And the Justices do not just invent ex nihilo the constitutional doctrines that the
avoidance canon beckons in. Constitutional litigators at the Court
tend to look for atmospherics — ideas and facts that, while not strictly
legal doctrines, may color the Court’s view of a case. For many years,
sophisticated litigants have been using the antinovelty concept as an
atmospheric to their constitutional challenges. But now — thanks in
part to the avoidance canon — the concept is leaking into the Court’s
constitutional doctrine. That trend leads to a more general point: the
mix of modern constitutional litigation, where sophisticated litigants
frame up arguments with constitutional-ish points, coupled with the
avoidance doctrine, has given us a dangerous cocktail. The avoidance
canon provides an opening for new doctrines, and the sophisticated litigants provide a source.
Part I of this Article dissects the avoidance canon as it is currently
practiced in order to isolate its most problematic uses. Part II sharpens the focus by returning to Northwest Austin, NFIB, and last Term’s
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
17 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT 224–25 (2007) (recounting an interview in
which Chief Justice Roberts emphasized his aim to achieve more unanimous opinions); Neal K.
Katyal, Op-Ed, The Supreme Court’s Powerful New Consensus, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 2014, http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/06/27/opinion/the-supreme-courts-powerful-new-consensus.html [http://
perma.cc/Y2N6-3AY7].
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Bond v. United States18 as exemplars of active avoidance. Part III
discusses a related question: if the avoidance canon can open the door
to new constitutional principles, where do those principles come from?
This Part uses the antinovelty doctrine to explore how atmospheric
points of sophisticated constitutional litigants are elevated into legal
doctrine. The influence that litigation choices have on the development of constitutional law is, of course, a topic broader than the
avoidance canon. But the avoidance canon offers judges a unique
opening to elevate atmospherics into doctrine precisely because the
new doctrine does not actually result in the invalidation of any law.
Part IV turns to the prescriptive question of how avoidance should be
used. It attempts to convert the normative critique of the prior Parts
into practical advice.
I. AN ANATOMY OF AVOIDANCE
A. A Typology
The canon of constitutional avoidance is by now so firmly entrenched in American judicial practice that the Supreme Court has
called it “beyond debate”;19 Judge Friendly once observed that to question it is “rather like challenging Holy Writ.”20 The singular term
“avoidance canon,” however, in fact encompasses a range of different
practices. It may be that certain varieties of avoidance are as unimpeachable as the canon’s reputation would suggest, while others are
far less defensible.21
To explore that suggestion, we first lay out a typology of avoidance.
Three variables distinguish the different types: the amount of statutory
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18
19

134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988). As a descriptive matter, that claim is quite obviously false. See RICHARD H.
FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 79–80 (6th ed. 2009) (describing the extensive academic debate about the avoidance
canon).
20 HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 211 (1967).
21 When we speak of the “avoidance canon” or “constitutional avoidance,” we refer only to the
canon of statutory interpretation, that is “[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in
question, and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that
this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided.” Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (internal quotation marks omitted). When we speak of the “varieties” or “types” of avoidance, we refer to the different ways in
which the statutory canon has been applied. We do not refer to the other doctrines described in
Justice Brandeis’s Ashwander concurrence, such as the practice not to “pass upon a constitutional
question . . . if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of,”
id. at 347, even though those other doctrines are sometimes loosely included under the rubric of
“constitutional avoidance.”
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distortion introduced to “avoid” the constitutional question, the level of
constitutional doubt needed to trigger the canon, and the nature of
that doubt. As for the first variable: the avoidance canon, if it is doing
any work in a case, will generally cause an interpreter to swerve from
the “best” reading of a statute.22 That statement is intentionally agnostic about interpretive method: it applies whether the interpreter is a
textualist, a purposivist, or something else (as long as one is reasonably
rigorous and consistent about her method). The avoidance canon will
cause some departure from whatever reading the method alone ideally
entails. That space — between the best reading according to the interpreter’s ideal method and the avoidance-compelled reading — is
what we mean by distortion. That space can be very small or very
large, and our first variable is its extent. In a number of recent, highprofile cases that we discuss below, the space is quite large: the Court
has endorsed statutory interpretations that would be unthinkable in
the absence of the canon.23 As those cases show, the canon empowers
courts to abandon normal principles of statutory interpretation whenever a serious constitutional issue looms. We call this feature of avoidance the “rewriting power.”
The second variable is the level of constitutional doubt required to
bring the canon into play. One form of avoidance, often called “classical” avoidance,24 is triggered only in cases of actual unconstitutionality.
To quote Justice Holmes’s formulation: “[T]he rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to
adopt that which will save the Act.”25 Note that one of these two
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22 See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 270 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“The doctrine of constitutional doubt does not require that the problem-avoiding construction be
the preferable one — the one the Court would adopt in any event. Such a standard would deprive
the doctrine of all function.”). Of course, a court may invoke the avoidance canon in support of a
result that it would reach without the canon. But in such a case, the canon would be superfluous.
The canon is significant and theoretically interesting precisely because it can displace what would
otherwise be the best reading of a statute. See Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995
SUP. CT. REV. 71, 89 (“Ashwander avoidance is only important in those cases in which the result is
different from what the result would have been by application of a judge’s or court’s
preconstitutional views about how a statute should be interpreted.”). In theory, it is possible that
the canon could be used to decide between two different interpretations that are in exact equipoise, though it seems such a case would be quite rare. Id. at 83.
23 It is difficult, if not impossible, to be perfectly agnostic about method when evaluating the
amount of statutory distortion in these cases. When we discuss them below, we try either to show
why the readings are implausible under different interpretive methods, or simply to employ a
middle-of-the-road approach that would be palatable to most lawyers. See William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321, 322 (1990) (noting the “underlying coherence in the Supreme Court’s practices of statutory
interpretation”).
24 See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 (1997).
25 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
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“possible interpretations” must actually be “unconstitutional” in order
for a court to adopt a saving construction.
This version of avoidance has been mostly superseded by “modern”
avoidance.26 Modern avoidance holds that constitutional doubts are
enough to trigger the canon, without any need to adjudicate actual unconstitutionality. As the Court put it in United States v. Delaware &
Hudson Co.27 — often cited as the source of modern avoidance —
“where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which
grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter.”28
One supposed advantage of modern avoidance is that it makes a constitutional holding unnecessary: if the ground of decision in an avoidance case is really statutory, then the adjudication of a constitutional
question could be challenged as advisory.29 Whether or not that is true
as a matter of Article III jurisdiction,30 to avoid a direct constitutional
ruling appears to be in harmony with the general attitude of reticence
toward constitutional adjudication exemplified most notably by Justice
Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority.31 The modern version of the canon itself encompasses varying
levels of constitutional doubt — it can (in theory, at least) be triggered
by any constitutional doubt, however weak and inarticulate, or only by
very grave doubts.
The third and final variable in our typology concerns the nature of
the constitutional doubt (for modern avoidance) or holding (for classical avoidance) that activates the canon. On the one hand, the constitutional issue might involve the application of settled doctrines or principles to some new circumstance, with no new law being made in the
process. For instance, there may be some question about whether a
statute reaches a form of expression that would clearly be protected by
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26
27
28

Vermeule, supra note 24, at 1949.
213 U.S. 366 (1909).
Id. at 408 (citing Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 211 U.S. 407 (1908)). Some
think modern avoidance has a longer lineage. See John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson
Revisited, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1495, 1510–12 (1997) (describing possible instances of the
“doubts” canon preceding Delaware & Hudson).
29 See Delaware & Hudson, 213 U.S. at 408 (“And unless this rule be considered as meaning
that our duty is to first decide that a statute is unconstitutional and then proceed to hold that such
ruling was unnecessary because the statute is susceptible of a meaning, which causes it not to be
repugnant to the Constitution, the rule plainly must mean [modern avoidance].”).
30 See Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1189, 1206 n.58 (2006) (“At most . . . Delaware & Hudson identified the kind of ‘advisory
opinions’ that courts are reluctant to provide as a matter of prudence, not the kind that they are
barred from rendering as a matter of constitutional authority.”).
31 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“The Court developed, for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision.”).
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the First Amendment. Or settled doctrine might call for a balancing of
interests, but it may be unclear how to strike the balance in a particular case. Both of those examples would involve the application of settled law to new circumstances. On the other hand, the canon may enable the creation of new constitutional norms, or it may allow for
significant innovations of settled doctrines. When the canon is used in
this latter way, we call it “generative” avoidance.32
We are particularly interested in the first and last variables. The
rewriting power and generative avoidance — together, active avoidance — are the forms of avoidance that are least justifiable under any
account of the canon’s value and function, particularly when they occur together.
B. Assessing Active Avoidance
1. The Rewriting Power. — The first and most obvious problem
with the rewriting power is that it leaves in place a law that Congress
never passed and may never have wanted to pass.33 Making matters
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32 These are not hermetically sealed categories. It may not always be clear whether a doctrinal extension is merely an application of settled law or the creation of a new rule. But we still
think “generative” avoidance is a useful category. First, in the mine-run of cases — such as
Northwest Austin and NFIB, analyzed here — it will be clear which side of the line a constitutional holding falls on. Second, the distinction between a new rule and an application of an old
one is already familiar to courts; whole areas of law are built upon it. For instance, in habeas law,
“the retroactivity of [the Court’s] criminal procedure decisions turn[s] on whether they are novel.”
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107 (2013). When a case announces a “new rule,” the
rule does not apply retroactively; when the case does not — that is, “when it is merely an application of the principle that governed a prior decision to a different set of facts” — then the rule may
be available to a petitioner on collateral review. Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Teague v. Lane,
489 U.S. 288, 307 (1989)) (internal quotation mark omitted). If that distinction is workable and
useful in habeas law, it can also be workable and useful to a court considering whether it is appropriate to apply the avoidance canon.
33 Our assessment of the rewriting power is limited to the judicial branch. We would need a
different set of criteria to evaluate the practice of active avoidance by those interpreting statutes
in the executive branch. See generally Morrison, supra note 30. There are, however, interesting
parallels between the “rewriting power” in the Roberts Court and the aggressive positions presidential administrations have taken in interpreting a number of statutes. To take just a few examples: When U.S. forces remained in Libya past the sixty-day deadline of the War Powers Act, the
Obama Administration contended they were not engaged in “hostilities” within the meaning of
that law. See Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th
Cong. 8–9 (2011) (statement of Harold Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State). When President
Obama swapped five Guantanamo inmates for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, he did not provide advance notice to Congress despite a law that seemed clearly to require it. See National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 § 1035(d), Pub. L. No. 113-66, 127 Stat. 853 (including notification requirement for all transfers or releases of Guantanamo detainees). The Administration
explained that “the notification requirement should be construed not to apply to this unique set of
circumstances.” Statement by NSC Spokesperson Caitlin Hayden on the NDAA and the Transfer
of Taliban Detainees from Guantanamo (June 3, 2014) (on file with authors). And perhaps most
infamously, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration relied heavily on the constitutional avoidance canon in the so-called “torture memo” to say that criminal statutes prohibiting
torture should be construed not to bar the use of enhanced interrogation techniques. See Memo-
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worse, it may be impossible for Congress to undo the Court’s statutory
decision. The Constitution by design makes it hard to pass, repeal, or
amend legislation. Under Article I, Section 7, both Houses must
affirmatively vote legislation (or any amendment) up, and then the
President must not veto it (or, if he does, the legislation must then
receive a two-thirds majority of each House).34 Within that process
there are numerous chokepoints — such as congressional committees or
filibusters — where a bill can become stuck. As a leading textbook has
put it, a bill must navigate a number of “vetogates” to become law.35
In ordinary settings, this friction is not a problem; it just means that
passing a bill is pretty hard to do, by institutional design.36 In the context of the rewriting power, however, this virtue becomes a vice: if the
Court rewrites a statute in a way that a majority of Congress does not
support, it creates a new law that is quite difficult for Congress to fix.
The Constitution’s architecture itself stymies the effort. If the gatekeeper at any one of the vetogates — the House of Representatives, the
Senate, the President, a Senate minority capable of filibustering, a
committee, even a committee chairperson — prefers the judicially rewritten law, a statutory amendment will fail. Indeed, even if every
member of the House of Representatives thinks the Court’s rewriting to
be wrong, forty filibustering Senators — or even a single Senator chairing the committee with jurisdiction over the bill — can block a change
and force the Court’s new law to remain on the books, even though that
law was never passed and never would have passed.37 The upshot is
that the rewritten statute is sticky and unlikely to go away.38
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
randum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J.
Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States, 11–12 (Mar. 14, 2003).
Constitutional concerns stemming from Article II often lurk, implicitly or explicitly, behind
these interpretive moves. Assessing active avoidance in the executive branch is beyond the scope
of this Article, but it strikes us as a related phenomenon and a fruitful avenue of future research.
For an illuminating study of how some of these questionable interpretive moves by presidential
administrations can be seen as a form of constitutional “self-help” in response to perceived congressional misdeeds, see David E. Pozen, Self-Help and the Separation of Powers, 124 YALE L.J.
2, 4–8, 76–80 (2014).
34 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cls. 2–3.
35 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 66–68
(4th ed. 2007).
36 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, at 417 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(“[T]he facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are
most liable . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, id. at 496 (Alexander Hamilton) (“The injury
which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.”).
37 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444–46 (2008).
38 See JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 105 (1997) (“[A] court misconstruing the legislature’s statutes may often disempower it from implementing anything very
close to the legislators’ most preferred policy.”); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as
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Professor William Eskridge has shown that, notwithstanding the
bias toward inertia in our constitutional structures, Congress in fact
“frequently overrides or modifies statutory decisions” by the Supreme
Court and lower federal courts.39 That historical pattern might suggest that our concern about legislative inertia is too simplistic. We do
not think that is the case. First of all, for whatever reason — increased partisan polarization in Congress is at least partly to blame —
congressional overrides have fallen off “dramatically” since 1998.40
The Roberts Court, at least, cannot confidently rely on Congress to
correct wayward interpretations. Second, it stands to reason that an
override would be less likely to follow an avoidance decision. Constitutional issues tend to be controversial; to inject a constitutional issue
into a statute (as an avoidance decision does) will only lessen the
chances that a polarized Congress will coalesce around an override.
As Professors Alexander Bickel and Harry Wellington once observed,
“To raise constitutional doubts is to inhibit future legislative action.”41
That is not just because constitutional issues are polarizing: a rational
Congress would generally be reluctant to take the time and energy required to pass a statute that a court has already signaled it might find
unconstitutional.
Recent history bears this out. We have identified every majority
opinion since Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court that expressly relies, at least in part, on the avoidance canon in reaching its conclusion
about the meaning of a statute.42 Congress did not amend any of the
provisions at issue in those cases in the aftermath of the Court’s decision — not one.43 Meanwhile, statutory overrides as a whole have not
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 255 (“[T]he avoidance canon may enshrine a result
that could not have been adopted ex ante.”).
39 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991).
40 Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional Overrides of Supreme
Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1340 (2014); see also
Richard L. Hasen, End of the Dialogue? Political Polarization, the Supreme Court, and Congress,
86 S. CAL. L. REV. 205, 209 (2013).
41 Alexander M. Bickel & Harry H. Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1, 34 (1957).
42 Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012); Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896 (2010); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009); Hawaii v. Office of Hawaiian Affairs, 556 U.S. 163 (2009); Bartlett v.
Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); Office of Sen. Mark Dayton v. Hanson, 550 U.S. 511 (2007); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Our definition
of an avoidance case in this footnote includes some cases where the canon is “superfluous.” See
supra note 22. And in some of these cases, it is at least disputable whether the majority in fact
relied on the avoidance canon. We are casting a wide net to show that, even on a broad definition
of an avoidance case, Congress has not overridden the Supreme Court.
43 Congress has, at times, amended other provisions of those statutes. In United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008), the Court’s reading of the PROTECT Act did not implicate the First

2015]

ACTIVE AVOIDANCE

2121

been reduced to zero: every Congress from the start of the Roberts
Court until 2011 overrode at least three Supreme Court decisions.44
The data thus suggests that the rewriting power has significant antidemocratic costs.45 That is ironic, since the avoidance canon is generally defended as a response to the countermajoritarian difficulty. In
fact, avoidance often results in a rewritten law that cannot be revisited.
A stylized example will make this point clearer. Suppose the Court
uses the avoidance canon to rewrite a law. Suppose also that an overwhelming majority of the legislature opposes the rewritten law. It may
be, however, that those in the minority have control over one or more
of the vetogates. In that case, a rewritten law with only the slimmest
support in the legislature, ostensibly the branch entrusted with lawmaking, will nonetheless remain in place. Moreover, it may be that, if
the Court had just invalidated the law, a majority of the legislature
would have coalesced around a compromise version that was both
constitutional and different from the judicially rewritten one. In that
case, the avoidance canon would not only have put in place a new law;
it would also have robbed the legislature of the chance to craft a legislative solution to a problem within the constitutional parameters laid
out by the Court.46
The rewriting power, then, may in practice have a countermajoritarian cost that exceeds that of outright judicial invalidation of a
statute.47 Moreover, because avoidance may be driven by mere doubt
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Amendment, id. at 294–97, while a concurring opinion relied on the avoidance canon to narrowly
construe the Act, id. at 307 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Act has since been revised a number of
times, but the language of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2012), the provision Williams violated that
was at issue in the case, has not been changed. Rapanos involved the definition of “navigable waters” in the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012). Again, the Act has been amended since
that case, but not the definition of “navigable waters.”
44 Christiansen & Eskridge, supra note 40, at 1340.
45 We don’t have comprehensive data about overrides of avoidance-based decisions before the
Roberts Court. We note, however, that only a small percentage of the congressional overrides
identified in Professor Eskridge’s original study followed upon judicial decisions driven by the
avoidance canon. See Eskridge, supra note 39, at 347 (noting that the “canons” were the primary
reasoning in eighteen percent of Supreme Court decisions overridden by Congress, which means
that the avoidance canon in particular would necessarily be a smaller percentage).
46 See MASHAW, supra note 38, at 105. This point is a variant of the “theory of the second
best”: where it is not possible to satisfy all the conditions necessary for a system to reach an overall optimum result, it is not always most optimal to satisfy as many of those conditions as possible.
If we assume that it is generally optimal for a court to apply the legislative choices made by Congress, but that a constitutional problem makes it impossible to do that perfectly, it may in fact be
more “optimal” to invalidate the law than reinterpret one provision. See generally Adrian
Vermeule, The Supreme Court 2008 Term — Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123
HARV. L. REV. 4, 17–23 (2009); R.G. Lipsey & R.K. Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second
Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
47 One counterargument would be that avoidance makes sense precisely because of legislative
inertia. In other words, because it’s so difficult to get a law passed, the Congress that passed a
bill would prefer to see its law blue-penciled rather than scrapped. The problem with that argu-
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about a law’s constitutionality, the law may have been rewritten even
though it was perfectly constitutional. It should thus not be assumed
that the rewriting power is a less drastic judicial intervention than invalidation of a statute.
We acknowledge that, to some extent, the problems with the rewriting power identified in this section will afflict all uses of avoidance.
Any time a court introduces any statutory distortion, it is effectively
imposing a new statute that may be impervious to a legislative override. That countermajoritarian cost may be justifiable in some circumstances, depending on the nature and gravity of both the distortion
itself and the constitutional problem that causes it. For instance,
where the statute approaches true ambiguity, or the statutory provision
at issue is an interstitial detail that was not the real focus of legislative
energy, it would be more acceptable for a court to impose its own reading to sidestep a significant constitutional problem. There is not a perfect verbal formula to guard the threshold of the avoidance canon.
The important point is that courts must be sensitive to the canon’s
significant countermajoritarian costs, and should not accept as an article of faith that avoidance is always preferable to outright adjudication. As it is, the avoidance canon gives judges ammunition, cover,
and a measure of psychological comfort when they are engaged in
what every judge would probably agree in the abstract is unacceptable
judicial behavior: rewriting a law.
2. Generative Avoidance. — Generative avoidance presents its
own problems. The avoidance canon enables — even demands48 —
sloppy and cursory constitutional reasoning. One obvious reason is
that the avoidance canon (in its modern form) asks a court to identify
only constitutional doubt, not a definitive problem. It is thus
unsurprising that an avoidance decision will lack the rigor and
deliberateness of a full constitutional analysis. But there is another,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ment, we think, is that it will be true only in some circumstances. Sometimes, as in our example
in the text above, supra p. 2121, a majority of Congress would prefer to rewrite its own constitutionally problematic law than have a court do so. And the avoidance canon has no resources to
distinguish the two circumstances. There is, however, another doctrine addressing just that issue:
severability. When this question comes up — should a law be blue-penciled or scrapped — the
best course is for a court candidly to say when some part of it is unconstitutional without undue
distortion, and then perform a severability analysis to decide whether the rest should be upheld.
See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3161–62 (2010)
(analyzing whether to sever a constitutional flaw from a statute). When a court uses the rewriting
power, it is, in effect, implicitly assuming the outcome of the severability analysis and acting with
less candor and transparency than a court that does the analysis explicitly.
48 After all, if the Court were to analyze fully the constitutional principle that creates the
“doubts,” it would subvert a core justification for avoidance — declining to engage in unnecessary
constitutional analysis. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979) (refusing to perform a full constitutional analysis in an avoidance case “as we would were we considering the
constitutional issue”).
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related reason, equally applicable to classical and modern avoidance,
that the constitutional reasoning in an avoidance decision may be
weaker: because a court can announce a constitutional principle
without actually having to strike down a law, avoidance frees a court
from the useful discipline of facing the real ramifications of that
principle.
Put another way, the avoidance canon allows the Court to make
constitutional law (and to have lower courts apply that new law) while
deferring the institutional consequences of its decision.49 If the Court
is using the avoidance canon at all, it means the constitutionality of an
act of Congress has been called into question.50 Generally speaking,
the most significant institutional consequence of a constitutional ruling
is the invalidation of a duly enacted statute. As Justice Holmes put it,
“to declare an Act of Congress unconstitutional . . . is the gravest and
most delicate duty that this Court is called on to perform”;51 Chief Justice Marshall called it an “awful responsibility.”52 But the avoidance
canon allows the Court to articulate (or at least advert to) a constitutional principle in a context where its real impact will not be felt. The
Court can create constitutional law without facing its “gravest” consequence in the case at hand.
Avoidance thus frees constitutional adjudication from a key structural limitation on the judicial power. This key limitation — reflected
in the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III and in the basic
structure of common law adjudication — is that reasons are tied to
outcomes. This relationship is a constant force for restraint in a common law system. If a common law court, for example, decides to adjust some private law doctrine, that choice must be made in a concrete
dispute where the consequences of that choice are felt and apparent.
The avoidance canon, however, severs reasons from outcomes because
a court may give a legal rationale without having to face that rationale’s full logical consequence — invalidation of a statute. And because the judgment in an avoidance case seems to be less violent than

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
49
50

See Re, supra note 1, at 182.
It is still an open question whether a federal court should apply the avoidance canon when
interpreting a state statute. Compare Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545, 548–52
(7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Posner, J., concurring in the judgment) (applying the avoidance canon to
interpret a state law), with id. at 553 (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Only a state
court can give an authoritative limiting construction to a state statute.”). See generally Abbe
Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie Doctrine, 120
YALE L.J. 1898, 1948–58 (2011).
51 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147–48 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
52 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400 (1819).
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striking down a statute, the constitutional reasoning and its implications will receive less scrutiny.53
The fusion of rationale and judgment as a structural limitation on
courts is manifest in many areas of Anglo-American law. Perhaps the
most obvious is the distinction between holding and dicta: only that
part of the reasoning of an opinion that is necessary to the judgment is
binding on future courts.54 The common law method assures the
soundness of a legal principle by tethering it to the concrete outcome
of a case.55 Courts develop a principle in a setting where its ramifications are evident. And, as a matter of precedent, the reasoning of an
opinion is binding only as far as it is concretized in a case.
The same concern drives Article III standing requirements. Injury,
causation, and redressability — the three bedrock requirements of
standing — all ensure that law unfolds in a context where the structural sources of judicial restraint are operative. As the Court has put
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
53 This problem of adventurism crops up in other areas of constitutional law as well. The
harmless error doctrine, for instance, has long been the bête noire of the defense bar — a doctrine
that courts cite when ruling against defendants while acknowledging that a constitutional violation occurred in prior proceedings. But it may be that in the long run the doctrine emboldens
courts to provide legal protections to defendants: if courts can issue constitutional pronouncements without having to worry that a defendant will go free, they may be more lavish in making
them. A similar point could be made about qualified immunity doctrine, at least where adjudication of the merits precedes the “clearly established” prong, see Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
232 (2009), or about constitutional rulings regarding officer conduct that are subject to the good
faith exception, see Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2427–29 (2011). See generally Thomas
Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847 (2005). It is beyond
the scope of this Article to grapple with the merits of those other classes of cases. We note, however, an important difference from the avoidance canon: the constitutional question in those other
cases will generally involve whether the conduct of a single officer was constitutional in some particular factual circumstance. They do not question the constitutionality of a statute. Deciding
questions of the latter type the Court has called its “gravest and most delicate duty,” whereas
questions of the former type tend to be more limited and fact-bound. And because the institutional consequences for the Court tend to be greater when it is reviewing an act of Congress, the
deferral of those consequences may be all the more problematic.
54 Chief Justice Marshall explained why:
It is a maxim not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be
taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is
obvious. The question actually before the Court is investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in
their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom
completely investigated.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399–400 (1821).
55 As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., once pithily put it: “It is the merit of the common law that it
decides the case first and determines the principle afterwards.” Codes, and the Arrangement of the
Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 1, 1 (1870). The common law method is not without its skeptics. E.g., Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 883 (2006). Needless to say, defending
the common law method is beyond the scope of this Article. We note only that belief in the “merit”
of the common law is so embedded in our legal culture and constitutional traditions that it provides a useful starting point for a critique of the avoidance canon.
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it, standing doctrine “assure[s] that the legal questions presented to the
court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”56 A generative avoidance
decision, in contrast, may proceed without a “realistic appreciation of
the consequences” of the constitutional principles it establishes.
This is not to say that avoidance decisions violate Article III in a
formal sense — the Court is still adjudicating a live case.57 And if the
constitutional reasoning of an avoidance decision drives the statutory
interpretation and therefore the outcome of the case, that reasoning is
not technically dictum.58 The point is that generative avoidance can
produce a new constitutional principle without giving that principle its
full effect. A court can lay down the legal framework for invalidating
a law on constitutional grounds without having to follow through with
invalidation. And because that consequence is deferred, the danger is
that the Court will be less constrained in announcing the legal change.
Moreover, it will almost always be possible for a skilled advocate to
identify “constitutional doubt” in an interpretive culture as pluralistic
as ours, so there is not much of a hermeneutic “check” on the avoidance canon trigger.59
One might object that it is often true that a new principle will have
ramifications that go far beyond an individual case, so that avoidance
decisions are not all that anomalous for common law courts. For instance, the Supreme Court may announce a new constitutional principle to strike down some relatively insignificant local law, and that
principle may foreshadow the invalidation of a much more significant
federal law in a later case.60 We still think generative avoidance is
uniquely problematic. Even when invalidating a relatively insignificant law, the Court will be engaged in a self-conscious act of judicial
review. It will therefore have to articulate a rule of constitutional law
and then apply it. That articulation, in turn, will push the Court toward a more realistic and accurate apprehension of the consequences
of the rule it announces. The dissent (if there is one) will be able to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S.
464, 472 (1982).
57 See Morrison, supra note 30, at 1205–06 n.58.
58 See Pierre N. Leval, Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1249, 1256 (2006) (defining dictum as “an assertion in a court’s opinion of a proposition of law
which does not explain why the court’s judgment goes in favor of the winner”).
59 The development of a highly specialized and skilled Supreme Court bar, which we discuss
in Part III, only exacerbates this phenomenon.
60 For example, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), the Court found that an application of the State of Washington’s mandatory sentencing scheme was inconsistent with the Sixth
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee. Id. at 305. A year later, in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S.
220 (2005), the Court, relying on Blakely, struck down the provision of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines that made their application mandatory. Id. at 243.
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explore and critique the implications of that rule, and presumably the
critique will inform whether the Court adopts the rule in the first
place.
A generative avoidance decision, by contrast, will be less visible
because it does not itself invalidate any law.61 The prospect of public
scrutiny and criticism of the decision will therefore operate as a less effective check.62 To the extent one values some kind of dialogue between the Supreme Court and the people in the elaboration of constitutional law, generative avoidance can “obscure[] the path of
constitutional law from public view, allowing the Court to alter constitutional meaning without public supervision.”63 Moreover, because the
Court only has to say whether a question is sufficiently “doubtful,” and
not what its answer is, it will necessarily be more vague about the new
constitutional principle it implicitly endorses. That vagueness will
make it harder to appreciate the ramifications of the new principle. In
a sense, generative avoidance allows the Court to make constitutional
law without fulfilling its Marbury “duty” to “say what the law is.”64
With the avoidance canon, the Court can usher in legal change, change
that will have countermajoritarian consequences (both in future invalidation and present distortion), without ever really saying clearly
“what the law is.”
In short, the canon of constitutional avoidance produces decisions
that are outliers in a system that demands a close connection between
reasoning and outcome. That is because the articulation of a new constitutional principle is nearly costless for a court — no law is struck
down as a result. The divorce of rationale and consequence can, in
turn, produce decisions that break new ground without the concentration and deliberateness that normally attend constitutional innovations.
3.
The Rewriting Power, Generative Avoidance, and the
Traditional Justifications for the Canon. — How does our critique of
certain forms of avoidance fit with the traditional justifications given
for the canon of constitutional avoidance? Broadly speaking, there are
three justifications for the canon in the literature.
The first bases the canon on a presumption about congressional intent. On this view, avoidance is a “tool” for choosing between alternative interpretations of a statute, “resting on the reasonable presumption
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
61 Consider the reception of Northwest Austin, which we discuss infra notes 105–108 and accompanying text.
62 See William H. Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 AM. L. REV. 641, 642 (1895)
(“Nothing tends more to render judges careful in their decisions and anxiously solicitous to do exact justice than the consciousness that every act of theirs is to be subjected to the intelligent scrutiny of their fellow-men, and to their candid criticism.”).
63 Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (With Particular Attention to Miranda v.
Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 63 (2010).
64 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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that Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts.”65 That assumption has been roundly and persuasively criticized. As Judge Friendly first noted, there is no reason to
presume that Congress operates only in areas free of constitutional
doubt. Nor is there reason to think that Congress would prefer to see
its words distorted because some federal judge harbors “doubts” about
the constitutionality of its law66: it is always possible that the judge,
when pressed, will ultimately uphold the law, and, if not, “classical”
avoidance can always lead to a saving construction anyway.67 Congress may also prefer to have the constitutional question adjudicated
finally so that it knows the boundaries within which it may legislate.68
These criticisms are even more unanswerable in the context of the
rewriting power and generative avoidance: the more Congress’s words
have been distorted, the less likely Congress can be presumed to intend
the distortion, and the newer the constitutional doctrine, the more likely
it is that Congress would prefer to have the doctrine well defined. If the
constitutional norm in an avoidance decision is totally new, it is even
more implausible that Congress was legislating against this backdrop.
A second justification regards avoidance as a species of judicial restraint.69 This view is most famously propounded in Justice Brandeis’s Ashwander opinion: because of the “‘great gravity and delicacy’
of its function in passing upon the validity of an act of Congress,”70 the
Court, as a matter of self-governance, “will shrink from exercising”71
this function except as a “last resort.”72 Alexander Bickel similarly justified the canon as a means to mitigate the countermajoritarian difficulty — that is, the apparent anomaly of unelected judges invalidating
the work of the elected branches in a democracy.73
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
65
66
67
68

Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 381 (2005).
See FRIENDLY, supra note 20, at 210.
Id.
Applied to classical avoidance, the congressional-intent rationale would go as follows: it is
presumed that Congress does not intend to legislate an actually unconstitutional result. But that
is bottomed on the same unpersuasive empirical presumption that Congress stays in bounds; after
all, a court’s invocation of the classical avoidance canon means it would otherwise interpret a
congressional statute precisely to achieve an unconstitutional result. Another conceivable justification for classical avoidance could be to presume that Congress would prefer to have its statute
distorted (or rewritten) rather than invalidated if it crosses the constitutional line. It seems to us
that this presumption cannot be applied in gross; it requires a context-specific consideration akin
to severability doctrine. See supra note 47.
69 See Morrison, supra note 30, at 1206–08 (describing the “judicial restraint theory” of modern
avoidance).
70 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
71 Id. (quoting 1 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 332 (8th ed. 1927)).
72 Id. at 346.
73 BICKEL, supra note 16.
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As we have already indicated, the Ashwander rationale is too simple. For one thing, there are circumstances when distorting a statute
in the name of avoidance does more violence to congressional intent —
and is therefore more countermajoritarian — than outright invalidation.74 For another, constitutional avoidance is in fact just a form of
constitutional adjudication, not something entirely separate.75 If it
does any real work in a case, avoidance necessarily results in some degree of statutory distortion. Avoidance is therefore a means by which
the force of the Constitution — indirectly, gravitationally — thwarts
congressional intent without the need for outright invalidation.
When a court considers whether to apply the canon, it is thus not
choosing between refraining from constitutional adjudication and engaging in it. Rather, it is choosing between two different modes of
constitutional adjudication. As it is, courts now dogmatically insist
that avoidance is to be preferred over invalidation, generally in the
name of self-restraint.76 But we think there are circumstances in
which (possible) invalidation is the preferable — even the more restrained — form of adjudication over avoidance.
That is so for two reasons. First of all, modern avoidance, because
it is triggered only by doubt, can sweep more broadly than the Constitution. As Judge Posner has explained, avoidance results in “a judgemade constitutional ‘penumbra’ that has much the same prohibitory
effect as the judge-made (or at least judge-amplified) Constitution itself.”77 If direct adjudication would result in a finding of no constitutional violation, the more restrained act (in terms of mitigating the
countermajoritarian difficulty) would be simply to uphold the law,
without any distortion of congressional intent. Second, as we explained above, generative avoidance allows a court to engage in constitutional lawmaking without the structural safeguards of judicial restraint operating effectively. It can change the law but put off the
consequences. The supposed restraint in a generative avoidance case
is mostly illusory; although a single statute might, in some sense, have
been saved from invalidation, a new constitutional principle with the
potential to doom other statutes (or even the same one) has been let
loose to do its work. In other words, the restraint ensured by adversary presentation of a constitutional issue in a case where it has signif–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
74
75
76

See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See Schauer, supra note 22, at 95.
See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012) (noting the Court’s “duty to construe a statute
to save it, if fairly possible” (emphasis added)); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971)
(“[O]f course statutes should be construed whenever possible so as to uphold their constitutionality.” (emphasis added)).
77 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation — In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 816 (1983).
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icant consequences may be more efficacious than the apparent “restraint” of declining to invalidate a law.
Returning to the traditional justifications for avoidance, a third and
final one sees the canon primarily as a mode of enforcing constitutional norms by making it more difficult for Congress to overstep them.
On this view, the canon is a “useful mechanism for realizing important
constitutional values.”78 The values operate as “resistance norms” —
that is, “rules that raise obstacles to particular governmental actions
without barring those actions entirely.”79 This is undoubtedly an important justification for avoidance in some circumstances, but it begs
the question of when it is an appropriate mode of enforcing constitutional norms. We will return to that issue in Part IV.
II. THREE RECENT EXAMPLES
Lest this all become too abstract, we turn to three recent, highprofile instances of the avoidance canon in action: Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, in which the Court invoked avoidance in construing a provision of the Voting Rights Act;
NFIB, in which the Chief Justice’s controlling opinion invoked avoidance as he upheld a key part of the Affordable Care Act; and Bond v.
United States, in which the Court dodged a major challenge to the
scope of the treaty power with a dubious act of interpretation.
A. Northwest Austin
Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965 “to banish the blight
of racial discrimination in voting, which ha[d] infected the electoral
process in parts of our country for nearly a century” after the Fifteenth
Amendment was passed.80 Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act prohibited certain jurisdictions with a history of voting discrimination from
making any changes to a “standard, practice, or procedure with respect
to voting” without first obtaining preclearance either from the United
States Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia.81 To get preclearance for such a change, a jurisdiction had to
show that the change had neither the purpose nor the effect of discriminating against minority voters.82 The initial version of the law was in
place for five years. Congress reauthorized it in 1970, 1975, and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
78 Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1585 (2000).
79 Id.
80 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
81 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2012), invalidated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
82 Id.
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1982.83 The Court upheld the constitutionality of the law after its initial passage and after each subsequent reauthorization.84 After many
months of hearings, Congress again reauthorized the law in 2006.85
The reauthorization passed unanimously in the Senate and by a lopsided margin in the House. A few years later, the Court agreed to reconsider Section 5’s constitutionality in Northwest Austin.
The plaintiff in Northwest Austin was a small municipal utility district in Texas. An elected, five-member board governed the district.
Because it was located in Texas, all changes to the district’s voting
procedures were subject to preclearance under Section 5.86 It filed suit
seeking a declaration that it was exempt from Section 5’s preclearance
regime because it qualified for a bailout under Section 3 of the Voting
Rights Act,87 or, in the alternative, that the Act was unconstitutional.
In the district court, Judge Tatel, citing “extensive evidence of clear
legislative intent,”88 wrote for a three-judge panel that there was “no
doubt” that the district was not eligible for a bailout.89 He then upheld the constitutionality of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed; citing its “usual practice” of “avoid[ing] the unnecessary resolution of
constitutional questions,” the Court held that the district qualified for
a Section 3 bailout.90
It was an archetypal instance of active avoidance.
1. Avoiding Through Rewriting. — First, the Court’s interpretation
of the statute was not plausible; it would not have stood a chance
without the avoidance canon. The original 1965 version of the VRA
specified only two types of jurisdictions that were eligible for a bailout:
(1) designated states and (2) “political subdivision[s]” that had been
separately designated for Section 5 coverage when the whole state had
not been.91 Obviously, the utility district would not have qualified
under that provision: it was not itself a designated state, and it resided
in a designated state (so the second path was unavailable). The
district, however, pointed to the 1982 amendments to the VRA, which
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
83 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314; Act of Aug. 6,
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, Tit. I, 89 Stat. 400; Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-205, 96 Stat. 131.
84 See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 327–28; see also Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282–85
(1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172–82 (1980); Georgia v. United States, 411
U.S. 526, 534–35 (1973).
85 Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization
and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
86 42 U.S.C. § 1973c.
87 Id. § 1973b(a).
88 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 234 (D.D.C. 2008).
89 Id. at 233.
90 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 197 (2009).
91 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 438 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C.A. § 10303(a)(1) (West 2014)).
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added a new type of jurisdiction that could bail out: “any political
subdivision of [a covered] State.”92 At first glance, that argument may
appear to be plausible — except that the Act defined “political
subdivision” in a way that blocked the utility district from qualifying.
The Act defined the term “political subdivision” as “any county or
parish” or certain other entities that “conduct[] registration for voting”
when the county does not.93 The district simply did not meet that
definition.
Moreover, the phrase “political subdivision of [a covered] State” in
the bailout provision was followed immediately by “though such [coverage] determinations were not made with respect to such subdivision
as a separate unit.”94 That latter phrase made clear that the only relevant “political subdivision[s]” were those that could have been made
subject to preclearance under Section 4(b) — and, again, the district
did not qualify.95 The legislative history also made it clear that the
definition of political subdivision just discussed applied to the 1982
amendments.96 Moreover, the Justice Department had interpreted the
provision to block bailouts for entities such as the utility district since
1987, and Congress did not take issue with that interpretation when it
reauthorized the Act in 2006. In short, the text, structure, legislative
history, and basic rationale of the Act plainly foreclosed the district’s
interpretation that it was eligible for a bailout.
Indeed, the statutory arguments seemed so weak that they were
hardly briefed; no one really thought that they had any chance of success. They received scant attention at oral argument. The bailout
provision was a minor sideshow to the constitutional arguments. And
yet the Court — invoking the avoidance canon — imposed that interpretation on Congress and the country.
One possible defense of this outcome would rely on “second-look”
doctrines developed and defended most notably by now-Judge Guido
Calabresi.97 Perhaps the Court’s implausible statutory interpretation
should be viewed as a kind of “legislative remand” intended to compel
Congress to revisit a coverage formula that had become obsolete? For
a number of reasons, we do not think Northwest Austin is defensible
on these grounds.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92 Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified as
amended at 52 U.S.C.A. § 10303(a)(1)).
93 52 U.S.C.A. § 10310(c)(2).
94 Id. § 10303(a)(1).
95 Id. § 10303(b).
96 See H.R. REP. NO. 97-227, at 39 (1981) (“When referring to a political subdivision this
amendment refers only to counties and parishes except in those rare instances in which the county
does not conduct vote[r] registration . . . .”); see also S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 69 (1982) (similar).
97 See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 8–15
(1982).
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First, “second-look” doctrines are aimed at a specific problem: statutory obsolescence. The theoretical basis is that an old law, supported
by past majoritarian preferences, may no longer enjoy more popular
support in the present than a judicial decision that conflicts with it.
But Congress had reauthorized the Voting Rights Act only three years
before Northwest Austin. It held twenty-one hearings, heard from
dozens of witnesses, amassed a record of more than 15,000 pages, and
then passed the law with overwhelming majorities in both houses.98 It
would therefore be impossible to defend Northwest Austin on the
ground that the Court was modifying the law to bring it closer in
line with present democratic wishes. The Court was directly defying
Congress.
Second, Judge Calabresi’s second-look doctrines are concerned
primarily with the interpretation of private law, where the legislature
is always supreme. Northwest Austin, by contrast, created a new constitutional doctrine that was used to invalidate a statute. Moreover, as
we have discussed, the very fact that avoidance decisions have some
constitutional basis means that the distortions they introduce will resist
a legislative response. If the purpose of a “legislative remand” is to encourage institutional dialogue, bringing in the Constitution is counterproductive. Injecting constitutional rhetoric into a statutory question
can freeze rather than facilitate a congressional response, both because
constitutional issues are polarizing, and because Congress would not
want to invest its time and energy in a law that may soon be found
unconstitutional. Judge Calabresi himself recognized that the use of
the Constitution “makes legislative correction of [a court’s] mistake
impossible.”99
The aftermath of Northwest Austin bears this out: Congress did
nothing — not so much as hold a hearing — in response to Northwest
Austin.100 And even if Congress were inclined to revamp the Voting
Rights Act in response to Northwest Austin, the Court had provided
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
98
99

Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2636 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
CALABRESI, supra note 97, at 11. Moreover, Judge Calabresi notes that the use of constitutional avoidance to force the legislature to take a second look at a possibly anachronistic law
may in fact hurt the practice of judicial review more generally. First, it “will tend to spawn highly
vulnerable constitutional doctrines” because the Court’s real motivation is not constitutional. Id.
at 12. The “inevitable errors” in these doctrines may “cast doubt on judicial review even in areas
where it is most appropriate and useful.” Id. Second, to use the Constitution merely to force the
legislature to take another look at an outdated law “cheapens, indeed destroys, the crucial moral
force that underlies and protects true constitutional decisions.” Id. Both of those criticisms would
apply to Northwest Austin, if that decision is understood merely as the Court’s way of forcing
Congress to reconsider again its support for the Voting Rights Act.
100 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 21, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96) (“Yet in the
more than three years after Northwest Austin, Congress held not one hearing, proposed not one
bill, and amended not one law in response to the concern that Sections 5 and 4(b) cannot be constitutionally justified based on the record compiled in 2006.”).
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little guidance because it identified the constitutional issue in such
vague terms. The Court thus put in place a law that never passed
Congress and would almost certainly never be undone. The Northwest
Austin opinion suffered from the straightforward antidemocratic problem with the “rewriting power” identified above.
2. Generating Law: The Equal Sovereignty Doctrine. — Furthermore, the constitutional basis for this distortion of the statute perfectly
illustrates the kind of cursory analysis that can occur under the banner
of avoidance. The crucial paragraph of the opinion reads:
The Act . . . differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy “equal sovereignty.” United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 16 (1960) (citing Lessee of Pollard v. Hagan, 3 How. 212,
223 (1845)); see also Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725–726 (1869). Distinctions can be justified in some cases. “The doctrine of the equality of
States . . . does not bar . . . remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.” Katzenbach, supra, at 328–329 (emphasis added). But
a departure from the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty requires a
showing that a statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the problem that it targets.101

The invention of the “equal sovereignty” doctrine in this passage
was a clear case of generative avoidance. The three cases the Chief
Justice cited all dealt with the “equal footing” doctrine, which provides
that new states enter the Union on equal terms with the other states.
That doctrine was expressly limited to the conditions of admission; it
had never been applied to differential treatment after admission to the
Union, so no one thought it had any applicability to the VRA. None
of the parties’ briefs even raised it. Ironically, the case that most clearly established the inapplicability of the equal sovereignty principle was
Katzenbach itself, in the precise passage the Court’s opinion quotes:
“The doctrine of the equality of States . . . does not bar [Section 5], for
that doctrine applies only to the terms upon which States are admitted
to the Union, and not to the remedies for local evils which have subsequently appeared.”102 The Northwest Austin opinion cut the italicized text with an ellipsis.
The bottom line is that the “doubt” that compelled the rewriting of
the bailout provision in Northwest Austin was at best a radical transformation of the equal footing doctrine, if not an outright invention.103
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
101
102
103

Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (emphasis added).
The legal commentariat generally viewed the doctrine as an invention. For example, Judge
Posner said: “[T]here is no doctrine of equal sovereignty. The opinion rests on air.” Richard A.
Posner, Supreme Court 2013: The Year in Review, SLATE (June 26, 2013, 12:16 AM), http://
www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2013/supreme_court_2013
/the_supreme_court_and_the_voting_rights_act_striking_down_the_law_is_all.html [http://perma
.cc/U7PZ-JPPE]. And Professor Michael McConnell: “There’s no requirement in the Constitution
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And yet the Court hardly defended it. The Court’s creation of the
equal sovereignty principle was as cursory as it was disruptive —
which is different from saying that it was wrong. It raised many more
questions than it answered. What justifies such a significant departure
from a settled line of precedent, which had established that the equal
footing doctrine applied only to state admission? Where does the
equal sovereignty principle come from? Is there a textual hook, or is it
just an inference from constitutional structure? If it is a structural inference, how can it be squared with the Reconstruction Amendments,
which had specifically authorized massive (and unequal) federal intrusions into the States to protect the rights of newly freed slaves? None
of these questions was even addressed in Northwest Austin. That
omission could not have occurred without the avoidance canon. The
Court had to do nothing more than advert to some unelaborated
“doubt” about the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act; it did not
have to clearly define the source of that doubt.
A crucial aspect of this case, to us, is the fact that the Court was
not forced to face the full consequences of its constitutional reasoning
because it upheld the Act. Doing so meant there was no strong dissent, and the Court was free from the institutional costs and the public
and academic scrutiny that always follow a statutory invalidation. In
a system where judges enjoy life tenure, that kind of scrutiny is one of
the most efficacious protections against judicial overreach.104 But
Northwest Austin was basically a cost-free articulation of a new constitutional principle.
Consider, for example, the coverage of the opinion in the press.
The New York Times trumpeted: “The Supreme Court on Monday left
intact one of the signature legacies of the civil rights movement, the
Voting Rights Act of 1965.”105 The Court “ducked” the constitutional
question, the paper explained, and “instead ruled on a narrow statutory ground.”106 A prominent law professor called it “the biggest act of
statesmanship of the Roberts court.”107 This coverage fails to convey
two important points: that the statute was rewritten by judicial fiat

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
to treat all states the same. It might be an attractive principle, but it doesn’t seem to be in the
Constitution.” Nina Totenberg, Whose Term Was It? A Look Back at the Supreme Court, NPR
(July 5, 2013, 3:35 AM), http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/198708325/whose-term-was-it-a-look-back
-at-the-supreme-court. See generally Zachary S. Price, NAMUDNO’s Non-Existent Principle of
State Equality, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 24 (2013).
104 See Taft, supra note 62, at 642–43.
105 Adam Liptak, Justices Retain Oversight by U.S. on Voting, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/23/us/23scotus.html.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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and that the Court had just minted a constitutional doctrine of equal
state treatment.108
One might respond that we are making too much of Northwest
Austin, that it was just an avoidance decision and therefore did not establish anything. That notion is dispelled by Shelby County v. Holder,
where the doctrinal seed sown in Northwest Austin reached full flower.
The equal sovereignty doctrine took center stage. And the Court
leaned heavily on its Northwest Austin decision: “[T]here is . . . a ‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the States.”109 Indeed,
after acknowledging that the main precedent on which it relied only
“concerned the admission of new States,”110 the Court again stated that
“we made clear in Northwest Austin”111 that “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States.”112
Was that really “clear” from Northwest Austin? Only if one abandons the conceit that constitutional avoidance is not really constitutional adjudication. Justice Ginsburg protested in dissent that Northwest Austin had merely raised a question, not answered it, but the
majority obviously thought otherwise: Northwest Austin had made the
“fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” clear. The Court was
thus able to use the avoidance canon to effect and then mask its major
doctrinal transformation: Northwest Austin wasn’t a big deal because
it upheld that statute; Shelby County wasn’t a big deal because it just
followed a principle established in Northwest Austin.
Would the Voting Rights Act have survived without the avoidance
canon? That is probably an unanswerable question. But it is at least
possible that, if the Court were forced to choose whether to invalidate
the Voting Rights Act under the equal sovereignty doctrine in 2009, it
would not have gone all the way.113 By the time Shelby County arrived, the change seemed less abrupt; Northwest Austin had made the
invalidation of a hugely popular, landmark “super-statute”114 seem less
radical and therefore, perhaps, more palatable. In any event — how–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
108 Perhaps that explains why Justice Ginsburg, in the same paper, declared four years later
that it was a mistake to join the Chief Justice’s opinion in that case. See Adam Liptak, Court Is
“One of Most Activist,” Ginsburg Says, Vowing to Stay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2013, http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/08/25/us/court-is-one-of-most-activist-ginsburg-says-vowing-to-stay.html.
109 Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) (quoting Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009)).
110 Id.
111 Id. at 2624 (emphasis added).
112 Id.
113 See Re, supra note 1, at 182 (“Had its feet been held to the fire, the apparent majority to
invalidate the law could have disintegrated, and a new majority of the Court might simply have
upheld the statute, rather than seize the first opportunity to strike at such a popular and symbolically important measure.”).
114 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
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ever the counterfactual world without Northwest Austin would look —
our main point concerns process: the Court should not have adopted
the equal sovereignty doctrine with so little ventilation. And it could
not have done so without avoidance.
Shelby County will not be the last word on equal sovereignty: Justice Benjamin Cardozo once described the “tendency of a principle to
expand itself to the limit of its logic,”115 and federal courts will have to
grapple with the logic and limits of the equal sovereignty principle for
a while. Just last Term, the Court denied certiorari in a petition challenging a federal gambling law on equal sovereignty grounds. The law
bans States from licensing sports-gambling schemes but exempts Nevada and three other States that already allowed sports gambling at
the time the law was passed.116 When New Jersey tried to allow instate sports gambling, various sports leagues and organizations sued
the state in federal court for violating the federal law. In defense, New
Jersey argued that the law “violates the equal sovereignty of the states
by singling out Nevada for preferential treatment and allowing only
that State to maintain broad state-sponsored sports gambling.”117 The
Third Circuit, in a fairly extensive analysis, first “decline[d]”118 to extend the equal sovereignty doctrine to this new context, and then, just
to be safe, concluded that the law would “pass[] muster” even if the
doctrine did apply.119 The Governor of New Jersey, along with a
sports-gambling association and a team of amici, sought certiorari in
the Supreme Court, claiming that the “Third Circuit’s holding cannot
be reconciled with the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty articulated most recently by this Court in Shelby County v. Holder.”120
The Court denied the petition, but its very existence confirms that the
equal sovereignty doctrine has been let loose in the lower courts and
the Court may have to step in to clarify it.121
In sum, Northwest Austin is an exemplar of the problems with the
avoidance canon. The constitutional reasoning was unsatisfying be–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
115
116
117
118
119
120

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).
28 U.S.C. §§ 3702, 3704(a) (2012).
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. New Jersey, 730 F.3d 208, 237 (3d Cir. 2013).
Id. at 238.
Id. at 239.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Christie v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 134 S. Ct.
2866 (2014) (No. 13-967).
121 Some litigants have even suggested that it should be expanded to state discrimination in
enforcement of a law, not just facial discrimination. United States v. Heying is an ongoing prosecution for marijuana distribution. No. 14-30, 2014 WL 5286155 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2014) (order
denying motion to dismiss and motions to suppress evidence). The defendant moved to dismiss
the indictment on the ground that the Government’s policy of declining to prosecute marijuana
dealing in states that have legalized the drug violates equal sovereignty. Id. at *4–5. The district
court rejected the argument, id. at *5, but the case suggests another potential expansion of the
equal sovereignty doctrine: to the unequal administration of a facially neutral law.
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cause the opinion hardly defended the equal sovereignty principle in
the face of a century of precedent against it. This gap would not have
been possible without the avoidance canon: if the Court had to adjudicate the equal sovereignty issue directly in Northwest Austin, or if a
strong dissent had challenged the point, it would have been compelled
to give a much fuller analysis. Moreover, the new constitutional principle propelled a substantial misreading of the statute, putting in place
a bailout mechanism that Congress had never passed. And, amazingly,
all of this proceeded under the guise of judicial restraint.
B. NFIB v. Sebelius
1. Avoiding Through Rewriting. — Chief Justice Roberts’s controlling opinion in NFIB is a rather strange instance of avoidance, for
reasons we will discuss. But it fits the basic pattern we describe in
this Article: using “avoidance” to usher in legal change. In the course
of rewriting a statute to avoid a constitutional problem, the opinion
birthed a significant innovation in constitutional doctrine.
The basic outlines of the controlling opinion are now familiar: the
Chief Justice held that the individual mandate was unconstitutional as
an exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause authority,122 but then, invoking the avoidance canon,123 he construed the mandate as a tax and
upheld it.124 From a methodological point of view, this move was odd
for a couple of reasons.
For one thing, the Commerce Clause “holding” was unnecessary to
the outcome of the case. The opinion could have simply upheld the
mandate as a tax and reserved resolution of the Commerce Clause issue for a case where it was squarely presented. The Chief Justice’s
own explanation for reaching the Commerce Clause question is bizarre: he said that “the statute reads more naturally as a command to
buy insurance than as a tax,” thus “[w]ithout deciding the Commerce
Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt such a saving construction.”125 That statement simply ignores the predominant modern
form of avoidance: that doubt is enough to trigger a saving construction.126 The Chief Justice could just as easily have said that he had
“grave doubts” about the constitutionality of the mandate under the
Commerce Clause, and then adopted his saving construction. To say
that he would have “no basis” for a saving construction without his
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
122
123
124
125
126

NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2584–93 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.).
Id. at 2593–94.
Id. at 2594–600 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2600–01 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added).
See Gillian E. Metzger & Trevor W. Morrison, The Presumption of Constitutionality and
the Individual Mandate, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE 124, 134 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds.,
2013).
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Commerce Clause holding is to disregard the most common version of
the avoidance canon — indeed, the very same form of avoidance he
himself had used for the Court in Northwest Austin, just two Terms
before.
One might respond: the Chief Justice was just applying avoidance
in its “classical” form, where the constitutional question is actually decided prior to adopting the saving construction.127 That may, as a
formal matter, be right. But it is clearly not true that, without the
Commerce Clause holding, the Chief Justice would have “no basis” to
adopt a “saving construction” of the mandate — modern avoidance
would be the basis. And given how rare a tool classical avoidance has
become in the modern judicial toolkit, one would expect at least some
sort of explanation before seeing it dusted off and brandished in an
opinion. In fact, NFIB seems a particularly unsuitable case for classical avoidance, given that it required, as a logical matter, establishing
two separate constitutional propositions: that a mandate cannot be
constitutional as a tax and that a mandate cannot be passed under the
commerce power. That’s an awful lot of constitutional law to make in
a decision that turns finally on the interpretation of a statute.
In any event, the Chief Justice invoked his “plain duty” to adopt an
interpretation that would “save the Act.”128 He acknowledged that the
“most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance.”129 But, he said, it is “fairly possible”
to read the mandate as a tax incentive.130 By its own terms, the Chief
Justice’s opinion reconceived the mandate “penalty” as a “tax.”131 And
the Chief Justice clearly believed that distinction was significant. In a
sense, then, the joint dissent was right that the Court upheld a “statute
Congress did not write,” and that doing so was “judicial overreaching”
masquerading as “modesty.”132 To be sure, the Chief Justice’s approach was better than the annihilation that the dissent called for,
even if it was not exactly restraint in the tradition of Ashwander.
This “rewrite” may not have been as obvious or severe as Northwest Austin — the Chief Justice’s opinion did not really change the
practical operation of the Affordable Care Act. Both before and after
his opinion, a citizen had a choice to purchase health insurance or pay
a specified sum to the Treasury. But the Chief Justice seems to have
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
127
128

See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S.
142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
129 Id.
130 Id. at 2594 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
131 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. at 2676 (joint dissent).
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been concerned with the law’s “expressive,” rather than practical, significance — that is, “whether the law expresses a view that the failure
to purchase insurance is unlawful.”133 And if you regard that dimension of the law as significant — as the Chief Justice and the dissenters
apparently did — then the controlling opinion reversed the law’s apparent meaning.134
2. Generating Law: The Antinovelty Doctrine. — The more
problematic aspect of the Chief Justice’s opinion is the highly
generative excursion on the Commerce Clause, which he justified with
the avoidance canon. That excursion yielded an important constitutional innovation that was entirely unnecessary to the case’s bottom
line. Commentary on NFIB has generally identified its main doctrinal
contribution as the activity/inactivity distinction: Congress cannot,
under the commerce power, force people into the stream of commerce
in order to regulate them. We believe this distinction is only a
manifestation of a deeper innovation that occurred mostly beneath the
surface. We call it the antinovelty doctrine: a law without historical
precedent is constitutionally suspect.
The principle that the Court must presume laws constitutional is as
old as judicial review.135 As Justice Washington put it long ago, “respect” for the “wisdom, the integrity, and the patriotism of the legislative body” compels the Court to “presume in favour of [a law’s] validity, until its violation of the constitution is proved beyond all reasonable
doubt.”136 That presumption is one of the bedrock principles of modern constitutional law, and, as Justice Jackson observed, it is more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
133
134

Metzger & Morrison, supra note 126, at 133.
Our own view, for what it’s worth, is that the Chief Justice could simply have rested his
opinion on the Act’s presumed constitutionality rather than on the avoidance canon. As the Chief
Justice recognized, the practical operation of the Affordable Care Act was constitutional under the
taxing power: the federal government can require a citizen to make a payment to the Treasury if
she chooses not to get health insurance. The challengers’ argument, at bottom, amounted to a
claim that Congress did not mean to impose a “tax” because it used the word “penalty.” The presumption of constitutionality rules out this fixation on labels. It entails, rather, a focus on a law’s
practical effects. It would be an odd way to show deference to a coequal branch of Government
to strike down a law whose practical operation is entirely constitutional merely because Congress
used the wrong label. See id. at 137. For constitutional purposes, the mandate is what it does.
And if what it does is constitutional, the presumption of constitutionality requires that it be upheld. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Health-Care Reform 8–12 (Yale Law Sch., Research Paper No. 228, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1856506 [http://perma.cc/6X6A-FS63].
135 See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (stating that courts
should not declare a law unconstitutional “on slight implication and vague conjecture,” but only
when “[t]he opposition between the constitution and the law [is] such that the judge feels a clear
and strong conviction of their incompatibility with each other”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 36, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (proclaiming that courts have a duty “to declare all acts
contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution void” (emphasis added)).
136 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827).
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than a “mere polite gesture.”137 It is “a deference due to deliberate
judgment by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress
that an Act is within their delegated power or is necessary and proper
to execution of that power.”138 And the presumption has always had
particular bite in cases involving Congress’s power to enact “economic” legislation, that is, legislation that “adjust[s] the burdens and benefits of economic life.”139
The Affordable Care Act is a paradigmatic economic regulation.
Before the Act, the uninsured would externalize the risks and costs of
their health care. One purpose of the Act, and the mandate in particular, was to force the uninsured to internalize those risks and costs. In
NFIB, then, one would expect to see the presumption of constitutionality in its strongest form. Instead, the Court displayed skepticism
from the start.
At oral argument, Justice Kennedy asked the following:
Assume for the moment that this is unprecedented. This is a step beyond
what our cases have allowed, the affirmative duty to act to go into commerce. If that is so, do you not have a heavy burden of justification?
I understand that we must presume laws are constitutional, but, even
so, when you are changing the relation of the individual to the government in . . . what we can stipulate is, I think, a unique way, do you not
have a heavy burden of justification to show authorization under the
Constitution?140

The premise of that question is that the presumption of constitutionality not only disappears when the law in question is “unprecedented,”
but is replaced by the exact opposite presumption: the government
bears a “heavy” burden to show that the law is constitutional. A novel
law faces a presumption of invalidity, unless the government can
overcome that heavy burden.
The Chief Justice’s controlling opinion picked up on Justice Kennedy’s question:
Congress has never attempted to rely on [the commerce] power to compel
individuals not engaged in commerce to purchase an unwanted product.
Legislative novelty is not necessarily fatal; there is a first time for everything. But sometimes “the most telling indication of [a] severe constitutional problem . . . is the lack of historical precedent” for Congress’s action. At the very least, we should “pause to consider the implications of

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
137
138
139

United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449 (1953) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 754 (1982) (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323 (1981)).
140 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11–12, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, 132 S.
Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-398), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts
/11-398-Tuesday.pdf [http://perma.cc/QSN3-VSBK].
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the Government’s arguments” when confronted with such new conceptions
of federal power.141

This paragraph was much more than a “pause”; it set the tone for the
analysis and did important substantive work. It explained the Court’s
reflexive skepticism that the Affordable Care Act was constitutional
under the Commerce Clause, even though it regulated seventeen percent of the gross domestic product and was unquestionably a reasonable response to one of the major economic issues facing the country.
Health care is also a unique kind of economic good; just about everyone will consume it at some point. As Judge Sutton observed in his
opinion upholding the Act, to decline to buy health insurance is not
“inactivity,” as the challengers claimed. It is a choice to self-insure, a
choice that imposes substantial costs on society.142 Moreover, as Judge
Silberman pointed out in his opinion upholding the Act, to require an
individual to buy insurance does not force him into the stream of
commerce any more than a farmer is forced into the stream of commerce when he is required to purchase wheat in the market instead of
growing it himself.143 Congress had required farmers to do just that in
the law upheld by the canonical case of Wickard v. Filburn.144
The antinovelty doctrine represented by that “pause” — that unprecedented laws are constitutionally suspect — is also reflected in the
basic structure of the Chief Justice’s opinion. After some preliminaries, the analytical section begins: “The Government advances two theories for the proposition that Congress had constitutional authority to
enact the individual mandate.”145 The first theory relied on the Commerce Clause, the second on the taxing power. As to the Commerce
Clause, the Chief Justice began the first subsection: “The Government
contends that the individual mandate is within Congress’s power because the failure to purchase insurance ‘has a substantial and deleterious effect on interstate commerce’ by creating the cost-shifting problem.”146 And the second subsection: “The Government next contends
that Congress has the power under the Necessary and Proper Clause
to enact the individual mandate because the mandate is an ‘integral
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
141 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (first quoting Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010) (alterations in original); then
quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995)) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
142 See Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 565 (6th Cir. 2011) (Sutton, J., concurring in part), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
143 Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 17–18 (D.C. Cir. 2011), abrogated by NFIB, 132 S. Ct.
2566.
144 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
145 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584 (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (emphasis added).
146 Id. at 2585 (quoting Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 34, NFIB, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398)) (emphasis added).
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part of a comprehensive scheme of economic regulation.’”147 The first
subsection refutes the Government’s first contention; the second subsection refutes the second contention. The opinion concludes: “The
commerce power thus does not authorize the mandate.”148
The opinion’s structure subtly confirms the disappearance of the
presumption of constitutionality. One consequence of the presumption
is that the challenger bears the burden of proving that a law is unconstitutional.149 The structure of the Chief Justice’s opinion evinces the
opposite approach: the Government seemed to bear the burden of establishing the constitutionality of the law.150 The logic of the opinion
is: (1) the Government says the law is constitutional because of X; (2) I
disagree with X; (3) therefore the law is unconstitutional. That is the
reverse of the structure one would expect under the traditional presumption of constitutionality. The challengers’ arguments were never
subjected to the traditional level of analytic scrutiny.
Consider, by contrast, Chief Justice Stone’s opinion in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,151 a case epitomizing the post–New
Deal presumption of validity attaching to social and economic legislation. There the Court recited the applicable legal principles, summarized a previous case where legislation had been upheld against constitutional attack, and then said: “We see no persuasive reason for
departing from that ruling here . . . and since none is suggested, we
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
147 Id. at 2591 (quoting Brief for Petitioners (Minimum Coverage Provision) at 24, NFIB, 132
S. Ct. 2566 (No. 11-398)) (emphasis added).
148 Id. at 2593.
149 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“[W]e [will] invalidate a congressional enactment only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional
bounds.” (emphasis added)). Even the Chief Justice’s opinion recites this black-letter principle.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2579 (“‘Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the government’ requires
that we strike down an Act of Congress only if ‘the lack of constitutional authority to pass [the]
act in question is clearly demonstrated.’” (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Harris,
106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883))). Of course, in certain categories of cases, a “more searching judicial inquiry” is warranted. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). But
no one contended that NFIB fit any of those categories.
150 Perhaps there is a more charitable interpretation of the structure of the Chief Justice’s opinion. One could say that its structure reflects the fact that the federal government has only enumerated powers, and therefore the Government must at least make a prima facie showing that its
actions fall within one of those enumerated powers. There are two difficulties with this reading.
First, it has never been the Government’s burden to specify the power under which it legislates;
part of the traditional presumption of constitutionality is that “the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.” Woods
v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948). Second, the opinion went well beyond just requiring a prima facie showing from the Government — refuting the Government’s contentions
was the basic task of the Chief Justice’s opinion. The tenor of the opinion evinces skepticism of
the Government’s assertion of regulatory power from the start, and that skepticism is the core of
what we call the antinovelty doctrine.
151 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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might rest decision wholly on the presumption of constitutionality.”152
The opinion reflects both a different attitude and different allocation
of burdens from NFIB. Gonzales v. Raich,153 a more recent case in
which the Court upheld a congressional act against a Commerce
Clause challenge, also has the opposite structure of the Chief Justice’s
health care opinion: the Court starts with the challenger’s arguments,
explains why those arguments are untenable under the Court’s precedent,154 and then affirms Congress’s authority to pass the act in question.155 Perhaps one could defend the structure of the Chief Justice’s
opinion as a natural outgrowth of common law adjudication. In particular, the fact that a federal law is unprecedented necessarily means
(1) that it has never been blessed by a judicial decision before, and (2)
that to invalidate it won’t result in the invalidation of many other similar laws. Point (1) could show why the Chief Justice subjected the
Government’s arguments to scrutiny, and Point (2) could explain why
it is fair to be less reluctant to invalidate an unprecedented law. We
think neither of these two explanations is persuasive.
Point (1) restates the common law truism that if an issue has never
been decided in the past it must be confronted as a matter of first impression. It could therefore explain why there was a health care case
at all. But the import of the Chief Justice’s antinovelty doctrine was
not that the Affordable Care Act was unprecedented and therefore its
constitutionality was an open question. Rather, the antinovelty question stacked the deck: the law’s constitutionality was an open question,
but the openness of the question was itself a “telling indication of a severe constitutional problem.”156 Point (2) — that striking down an
unprecedented law is less consequential because other existing laws
will be unaffected — would not hold if the antinovelty doctrine were
systemically applied. Yes, a single antinovelty decision may not result
in the invalidation of a large number of federal laws, and so the federal government might not be immediately hamstrung. But if each time
the federal government tried to craft a new solution to a new problem
it had to face the skeptical gaze of the judiciary, the consequences for
federal power would be graver than a single decision that affected a
number of current laws.
Antinovelty played a big role for the joint dissenters as well. Their
joint opinion has the same structure as the Chief Justice’s — the Government’s arguments are unpersuasive, therefore the law is unconstitu–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
152
153
154
155
156

Id. at 148.
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
See id. at 17–22 (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
Id. at 22.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Free Enter. Fund v.
Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3159 (2010)) (alteration omitted).
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tional. And they repeatedly referred to the legislation as unprecedented. They did so when outlining the market for insurance,157 and when
they explained other ways the health crisis could be solved.158 They
looked to novelty in assessing the Medicaid question as well.159 The
very last words in the Court’s set of opinions, by Justice Thomas,
were: “The Government’s unprecedented claim in this suit that it may
regulate not only economic activity but also inactivity that substantially affects interstate commerce is a case in point.”160
To be fair, NFIB did not invent the antinovelty doctrine ex nihilo.
There were important forerunners. The question presented by one of
those earlier cases — Printz v. United States161 — was whether a federal law requiring state officials to conduct background checks on gun
buyers was constitutional. The Court held that requiring state officers
to “administer” a “federal regulatory program” was “incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”162 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion began with “historical understanding and practice.”163
And it noted, uncontroversially, that very early legislative enactments
can be “weighty” contemporaneous evidence of the Constitution’s
meaning.164 But then Justice Scalia added his own corollary: “Conversely if, as [the challengers] contend, earlier Congresses avoided use
of this highly attractive power, we would have reason to believe that
the power was thought not to exist.”165
That corollary did not follow from the premise: even if it is true
that an early Congress passing a law suggests it considered the law
constitutional, the fact that past Congresses did not pass a law could
be due to any number of reasons unrelated to the law’s constitutionality. Perhaps there was simply no need for the controversial device in
question; perhaps there was political opposition unrelated to the device’s constitutionality. Justice Scalia tried to cabin the inference by
adding that the federal power would have to be “attractive.”166 But if
one’s general view is that the United States Congress tends to “draw[]
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
157 Id. at 2648 (joint dissent) (“Such a definition of market participants is unprecedented, and
were it to be a premise for the exercise of national power, it would have no principled limits.”).
158 Id. at 2647 (“With the present statute, by contrast, there are many ways other than this unprecedented Individual Mandate by which the regulatory scheme’s goals of reducing insurance
premiums and ensuring the profitability of insurers could be achieved.”).
159 Id. at 2664.
160 Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
161 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
162 Id. at 935.
163 Id. at 905.
164 Id. (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986)).
165 Id.
166 Id.
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all power into its impetuous vortex,”167 it is hard to imagine a variety
of power that would not be attractive. In any event, Justice Scalia
concluded that the “lack of statutes imposing obligations on the States’
executive . . . suggests an assumed absence of such power.”168
A variety of the antinovelty doctrine then reappeared several years
later in another case presenting a structural issue, Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.169 The respondent Board (as then constituted) was composed of five members
appointed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The
SEC, however, could remove Board members only for “good cause.”170
The SEC Commissioners, in turn, were also removable only by the
President for cause.171 The issue in Free Enterprise Fund was whether this “double for-cause” protection was consistent with the separation
of powers.172
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, concluded that it was
unconstitutional. Unlike Printz, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Free Enterprise Fund began with precedent and structural
analysis. But toward the end of the opinion, quoting Judge Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion below, the Chief Justice wrote: “Perhaps
the most telling indication of the severe constitutional problem with
the [Board] is the lack of historical precedent for this entity. Neither
the majority opinion nor the [Board] nor the United States as
intervenor has located any historical analogues for this novel structure.”173 This statement hovered somewhere between rhetorical dressing and doctrine; it came at the end of the analysis section, and it is
unlikely the case would have come out differently if it were excised.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
167 Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2094 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
168 Printz, 521 U.S. at 907–08.
169 130 S. Ct. 3138.
170 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(6) (2012).
171 Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3148.
172 Id. at 3149 (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667,
697 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
173 Id. at 3159 (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 537 F.3d at 699 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)) (internal
quotation mark omitted). The only support Judge Kavanaugh offered for the principle that novelty can indicate unconstitutionality was Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986). That was a case
about whether the Comptroller General, who is removable only by Congress, could perform certain executive functions. Judge Kavanaugh quoted the Court’s observation that “[a]ppellants
have referred us to no independent agency whose members are removable by the Congress . . . as
is the Comptroller General.” Free Enter. Fund, 357 F.3d at 699 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4). The reason the Court made that observation, however, was to
show that “[a]ppellants therefore are wide of the mark in arguing that an affirmance in this case
requires casting doubt on the status of ‘independent’ agencies.” Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725 n.4. In
other words, the fact that other similarly situated officers could not be identified meant that its
decision would not have far-reaching and disruptive consequences. There was no suggestion that
the lack of such officers had any bearing on constitutionality.
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On the other hand, taken on its own terms, it is quite a strong assertion: “[L]ack of historical precedent” can signal a “severe constitutional
problem.”174 That was the line Chief Justice Roberts quoted in
NFIB.175
By the time the antinovelty doctrine appeared in the health care
case, then, it already had some significant support. But NFIB took it
further in three ways. First, the mere fact that the doctrine appeared
at all in the most important constitutional case of the Roberts Court is
itself significant. Doctrines gain solidity by repetition, particularly in
prominent cases. Second, as noted above, the antinovelty doctrine is
laced into the very structure of the Chief Justice’s opinion. The opinion begins with skepticism of the Government’s argument and places
the burden on the government to prove the law’s constitutionality.
The most important difference, however, is that NFIB involved the
scope of the commerce power, where the presumption of constitutionality has had and should have the most force. Both Free Enterprise
Fund and Printz involved rather arcane structural issues of first impression: whether an underling in an administrative agency can have
double for-cause protection, and whether state executive officers can
be impressed to administer a federal program. The presumption of
constitutionality, even if nominally applicable, has never had much
force in those kinds of structural cases. Neither Printz nor Free Enterprise Fund even gives the perfunctory recitation of the presumption
that NFIB did, and Justice Scalia is on record saying that the presumption does not even apply in separation-of-powers cases.176
NFIB was a very different kind of case. It involved a core provision of the most significant economic legislation since President Johnson’s Great Society programs. The case was about the scope of the
federal government’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause,
where the presumption of constitutionality is at its apex.177 To import
the antinovelty doctrine into a case about the power of Congress to
enact a major economic reform would erode the most important function of the presumption of constitutionality.
Judge Silberman, in his opinion below upholding the Affordable
Care Act, saw clearly how the antinovelty arguments pressed by the
law’s challengers would collide with the presumption of constitutional–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
174 Free Enter. Fund., 130 S. Ct. at 3159 (quoting Free Enter. Fund., 537 F.3d at 699
(Kavanaugh, J. dissenting)).
175 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2586 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.) (quoting Free Enter. Fund, 130
S. Ct. at 3159).
176 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 704–05 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
177 See, e.g., Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 754 (1982); United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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ity.178 “Since [the challengers] cannot find real support for their proposed rule in either the text of the Constitution or Supreme Court
precedent, they emphasize . . . the novelty of the mandate . . . .”179
Citing Free Enterprise Fund and Printz, Judge Silberman noted that
the novelty was “not irrelevant.”180 But, he wrote, “the novelty cuts
another way,” explaining: “We are obliged — and this might well be
our most important consideration — to presume that acts of Congress
are constitutional. [The challengers] have not made a clear showing to
the contrary.”181 In other words, Judge Silberman understood that the
antinovelty doctrine would eviscerate the presumption. That is because the only time the presumption of constitutionality has any bite is
when Congress enacts a novel solution to a novel national problem; if
Congress had stuck to its old, judicially approved tools, there would be
no need for a presumption. When forced to choose between the presumption of constitutionality and the antinovelty doctrine, Judge
Silberman chose the former, and, unsurprisingly, upheld the law.
The “most important consideration” of Judge Silberman’s opinion — the presumption — is exactly what’s lacking in the Chief Justice’s opinion. The antinovelty doctrine had erased it. That expansion
of the antinovelty doctrine into the Commerce Clause seems to us the
most radical legacy of NFIB.
It remains to be seen what effect it will have in lower courts, but
early indications are not good. Soon after the health care case was decided, the D.C. Circuit invalidated part of the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008,182 which had empowered Amtrak
and the Federal Railroad Administration to develop jointly “metrics
and standards” to ensure on-time train service.183 In the course of its
analysis, the court asserted that “novelty may, in certain circumstances,
signal unconstitutionality.”184 The court further explained that the
lack of an “antecedent” is a “reason to suspect” a law or practice’s constitutionality, citing both NFIB and Free Enterprise Fund.185 That
sounds an awful lot like a new doctrine of constitutional law. To be
sure, this D.C. Circuit case, like Printz and Free Enterprise Fund, did
not directly involve the scope of the commerce power in the same way

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
178
179
180
181
182

Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Id. at 18.
Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
Pub. L. No. 110-432, div. B, 122 Stat. 4848, 4907–70 (codified in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.).
183 Ass’n of Am. R.Rs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 721 F.3d 666, 669 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
184 Id. at 673.
185 Id.
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that NFIB did.186 But the case at least suggests that the antinovelty
doctrine has grown more solid in the wake of NFIB.187
The important point for our purposes is that this expansion of the
antinovelty doctrine occurred in a case where it was immaterial. As
we have explained, the Commerce Clause “holding” did not have any
effect on the bottom-line judgment.188 As with the equal sovereignty
doctrine, the scope and underpinnings of the antinovelty doctrine are
obscure. Indeed, the Court never consciously defended the doctrine,
even though it is vulnerable on a number of fronts.
The antinovelty doctrine is not grounded in the text of the Constitution. It is, moreover, alien to the Constitution’s structure. The federal government was not established to meet some known and specific
contingency. Rather, it was granted a number of powers in broad
strokes that would enable it to adapt to economic, social, and political
change.189 Chief Justice Marshall explained in McCulloch that the
Constitution is “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”190 To fulfill
that role, the federal government must be able to act in unprecedented
ways; it must craft new and effective solutions to unprecedented problems. A constitution that permits the government merely to do what
it has already done before would be ineffective; it would be adapted
only to the stasis, not the “crises,” of human affairs. Reflecting this in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
186 Compare id. at 670 (interpreting the Article I Vesting Clause), and Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 923–24 (1997) (analyzing whether a state executive official can be commandeered to
enforce a federal regulatory program), and Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight
Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151–55 (2010) (interpreting the Article II Vesting Clause and the Take Care
Clause), with NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587–91 (2012) (interpreting the Commerce Clause).
187 As this Article was being finalized, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the
D.C. Circuit opinion in American Railroads. See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S.
Ct. 1225 (2015). The Court based its ruling on grounds not relevant here, saying that the lower
court opinion rested on the flawed premise that Amtrak was a private, rather than a governmental, entity. And it remanded the case for the D.C. Circuit to reconsider the constitutionality of the
Act. The Supreme Court did not reach any of the ultimate constitutional issues in the case, and
therefore did not have occasion to review the D.C. Circuit’s “antinovelty” reasoning.
188 See supra pp. 2137–38.
189 As Alexander Hamilton put it:
Constitutions of civil Government are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination of these, with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and tried course of human affairs. Nothing therefore can be more fallacious, than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be lodged in the National
Government, from an estimate of its immediate necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen; and, as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra note 36, at 210–11 (Alexander Hamilton).
190 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819); see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2565 (2014) (“The Founders knew they were writing a document designed to
apply to ever-changing circumstances over centuries. After all, a Constitution is ‘intended to endure for ages to come,’ and must adapt itself to a future that can only be ‘seen dimly,’ if at all.”
(quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 415)).
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sight, McCulloch’s test for federal power was simple and functional:
“Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution,
and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”191 There is not a trace of
antinovelty there.192
Our purpose is not to debunk the antinovelty doctrine on the merits.193 It is merely to point out how the avoidance doctrine made its
development possible. The antinovelty doctrine — and specifically its
expansion into Commerce Clause issues — threatens to be one of the
most consequential constitutional innovations in recent memory. And
yet, thanks in large part to the avoidance doctrine, the Court was not
compelled to define it carefully, to defend it with any kind of rigor, or
to face its full consequences. In short, just like Northwest Austin,
NFIB displays the mismatch between the rhetoric of restraint and the
reality of aggression that is the hallmark of recent avoidance decisions.
C. Avoiding Avoidance: Bond v. United States
The Court also recently avoided a significant constitutional challenge to the federal government’s treaty power.194 Bond v. United
States195 was, in the Chief Justice’s apt phrase, a “curious case,”196
about “an amateur attempt by a jilted wife to injure her husband’s
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
191
192

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
Justice Ginsburg made a similar point forcefully in her NFIB dissent. 132 S. Ct. at 2615–
16, 2625 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in
part).
193 One can imagine, for instance, an originalist defense of NFIB’s antinovelty argument. The
defense would run: The New Deal cases upholding the most extravagant claims of federal power,
such as Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), were wrongly decided. Because of respect for
stare decisis or for pragmatic reasons, however, they cannot be overturned. The way to be most
faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution, then, is to accept those precedents but refuse
to expand them any further. The antinovelty doctrine, on this reading, could be a bulwark
against the expansion of a set of questionable precedents. See Randy Barnett, “This Far and No
Farther”: Baselines and the Individual Insurance Mandate, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 22,
2012, 3:00 PM), http://volokh.com/2012/01/22/this-far-and-no-farther-baselines-and-the-individual
-insurance-mandate [http://perma.cc/Z2TA-PUST]. That is certainly a cogent defense of the
antinovelty doctrine in this context, but it would be a radical move for the Supreme Court to take.
It would involve the implicit repudiation of a number of canonical New Deal precedents and a
significant change in the general consensus regarding the legal significance of that era. See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1,
51–55 (2013) (arguing that the “this far and no farther” theory would “imply the invalidation of
much of the New Deal and Great Society legislation that constitutes the contemporary regulatory
state” and is “radically implausible as an alternative gestalt,” id. at 52).
194 Disclosure: One of the authors was a law clerk at the Supreme Court during the 2013 Term.
The following discussion relies exclusively on publicly available materials and neither reveals nor
is informed by any confidential information.
195 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014).
196 Id. at 2090.
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lover, which ended up causing only a minor thumb burn readily treated by rinsing with water.”197 Though local Pennsylvania authorities
declined to get involved in the spat, the federal government — “surprising[ly]”198 — decided to charge Bond with violating a federal statute implementing a treaty called the Convention on Chemical Weapons, which the United States had ratified in 1997.199 The question
in the case was whether the statute was a necessary and proper means
of executing the federal government’s unquestioned power to make
treaties.200
Missouri v. Holland201 had already answered this question in 1920.
“If the treaty is valid,” Justice Holmes wrote for the Court, “there can
be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article I, § 8, as a
necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”202 The real issue before the Court in Bond, then, was whether
Holland ought to be overruled.203 It should come as no surprise that,
faced with this mighty question of constitutional structure, the Court
punted. Citing its Ashwander obligation “not [to] decide a constitutional question if there is some other ground upon which to dispose of
the case,”204 the Court held that the statute did not in fact cover
Bond’s conduct.205
That interpretation of the statute was, to put it gently, “strained.”206
To put it with Scalian bluntness, it was “result-driven antitextualism.”207 The naked text could hardly have been clearer. The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998208 makes it a
crime to “use . . . any chemical weapon.”209 A “chemical weapon” is a
“toxic chemical and its precursors, except where intended for a purpose not prohibited under this chapter.”210 A “toxic chemical” is “any
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 2083.
Id. at 2085.
Id. at 2083.
Id. at 2087; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
Id. at 432.
See Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2087.
Id. (quoting Escambia Cnty. v. McMillan, 466 U.S. 48, 51 (1984) (per curiam)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
205 Id. at 2093.
206 Markadonatos v. Vill. of Woodridge, 760 F.3d 545, 553 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J., concurring in the judgment).
207 Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Heather K.
Gerken, The Supreme Court, 2013 Term — Comment: Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128
HARV. L. REV. 85, 92 (2014) (“[T]he [majority] opinion is filled with enough analytic holes that it
could be dismembered by a 1L, let alone the wily Justice Scalia.”).
208 Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681–856 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
209 18 U.S.C. § 229(a)(1) (2012).
210 Id. § 229F(1)(A).
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chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation or permanent harm to humans or animals.”211 As if to drive home its expansiveness unmistakably, the
definition continues: “The term includes all such chemicals, regardless
of their origin or of their method of production.”212 Finally, a “purpose
not prohibited” is “[a]ny peaceful purpose related to an industrial,
agricultural, research, medical, or pharmaceutical activity or other
activity.”213
The case for Bond’s prosecution seems to follow ineluctably from
the text. She certainly “use[d] . . . toxic chemical[s]”: 10-chloro-10Hphenoxarsine (an arsenic-based compound) and potassium dichromate,
both of which are lethal in high enough doses.214 And her purpose —
to harm her husband’s paramour — was evidently not “peaceful.”
So how did the Court wriggle free from the seemingly clear import
of the text? By leaning on an interpretive presumption: “[U]nless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance.”215 In other words, when a
statute is ambiguous, “it is appropriate to refer to basic principles of
federalism embodied in the Constitution to resolve [the] ambiguity.”216
The statute in Bond was meant to implement a treaty about chemical
warfare. And the Court, sensibly enough, observed that the “global
need to prevent chemical warfare does not require the Federal Government to reach into the kitchen cupboard,” so there “is no reason to
suppose that Congress — in implementing the Convention on Chemical Weapons — thought otherwise.”217
The problem with the Court’s opinion, as Justice Scalia pointed
out, is the logical circularity at its core. As the Court acknowledged,
the federalism presumption it invoked is available only when a statute
is ambiguous. But then it explained: “In this case, the ambiguity derives from the improbably broad reach of the key statutory definition”
and “the deeply serious consequences of adopting such a boundless
reading.”218 The Bass presumption says that a court should resolve
statutory ambiguity in favor of a reading that does not disrupt the balance of federal and state power; the Bond opinion seemed to suggest
that a statute can be ambiguous because it threatens the balance of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218

Id. § 229F(8)(A) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. § 229F(7)(A).
Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2085 (2014).
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971), cited in Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2089–90.
Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2090.
Id. at 2093.
Id. at 2090 (emphasis added).
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federal and state power. There does not seem to be any textual ambiguity in the law.219
From a textualist standpoint, then, Bond is hard to defend. The
text seems clear, and a textualist does not generally decline to apply
text because of its “improbably broad reach” or because “there is no
reason to suppose that Congress” wanted the text to be as broad as it
appears.220 That said, if one takes a more purposive approach to statutory interpretation, Bond fares better. What seems, in the end, to be
driving the Court’s opinion is its apparent disbelief that Congress could
have wanted to make the use of household items like detergent a federal crime, in light of the statute’s (and treaty’s) purpose to address the
international problem of chemical weapons. This instinct is a variant
of the well-known “mischief rule”221: the “mischief” Congress was addressing in this law was the global proliferation of chemical weapons,
and the episode of Bond and her husband’s paramour is so far removed from this “mischief” that the statute could not possibly cover it.
How do we assess Bond, then, as an instance of the rewriting power? The level of violence Bond did to the practice of statutory interpretation will depend upon one’s methodological commitments. As an
instance of textualism it is hard, if not impossible, to defend. On the
other hand, the animating point of the opinion may very well be right:
that the Congress that passed the law — reasonable legislators pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably — did not intend to make a federal crime of Bond’s desperate prank. Given the textualist bent of the
modern Supreme Court,222 however, Bond is a good example of the
Court subordinating statutory interpretation to a possible constitutional problem. It shows the alacrity with which the Court will bend a
statute to avoid confronting a constitutional issue.
To us, though, the more important reason that Bond was not as
problematic as either Northwest Austin or NFIB is that it was less
generative. The key difference is that Bond does not purport — at
least on its face — to be an “avoidance” case.223 Because the opinion
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
219 Bond’s brief had proposed that the statute’s exception for “peaceful purposes” might be ambiguous enough to construe to not cover Bond’s conduct; the argument would be roughly that
peaceful means “non-warlike,” and Bond’s assault, which was certainly violent, was not warlike.
Brief for Petitioner at 51–52, Bond, 134 S. Ct. 2077 (No. 12-158), 2013 WL 1963862. The Court
declined that possible road to ambiguity, and Justice Scalia expressly rejected it. Bond, 134 S. Ct.
at 2094–95 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
220 See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1440 (2010)
(arguing, in Justice Scalia’s words, that “what matters is the law the Legislature did enact” and
that “[w]e cannot rewrite that to reflect our perception of legislative purpose”).
221 See, e.g., Heydon’s Case, (1584) 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Exch.) 638–39.
222 Justice Breyer is the only active Justice who explicitly advocates a brand of purposivism.
See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 88–105 (2010).
223 Although the Bond Court does briefly cite the constitutional avoidance canon, 134 S. Ct. at
2087, the Court’s ultimate reading of the statute is rooted in a federalism clear-statement rule
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did not define some specific constitutional problem it was purportedly
“avoiding,” it did not really generate new substantive law. Northwest
Austin resulted in the equal sovereignty principle, and NFIB created a
new limit on the commerce power. But Bond rested only on an interpretive presumption that had been applied in many cases, and can, in
theory anyway, be overridden by a clear statement by Congress. Justice Scalia may be right that the presumption was misapplied in Bond,
but that kind of mistake should not have the same systemic impact as,
say, the equal sovereignty or antinovelty doctrines.
To see what we mean, imagine that Bond had been constructed differently. The Court might have begun by acknowledging Missouri v.
Holland, might have opined that Justice Holmes’s discussion was too
brief to merit full stare decisis effect, might have then intoned its
doubts about the continuing constitutional soundness of Holland, and
then listed the arguments driving those doubts. It might then have
construed the statute in light of those doubts. If the Bond challenge
were to return in the future, the Court could then point to its discussion of Holland in Bond as weakening an already precarious precedent. And Bond could then have been used to make the overturning
of Holland appear less radical. In that way, this counterfactual Bond
would have been generative, eroding Holland and erecting a new barrier to congressional power without having to strike down a law. By
sticking to an interpretive clear-statement rule rather than constitutional avoidance, however, the Court mostly avoided that pitfall.
All in all, we think Bond is less problematic than Northwest Austin
and NFIB because it is defensible under at least some theories of statutory interpretation and lacks a generative constitutional discussion.
But Bond does make one thing perfectly clear: the Court will bend
over backward to avoid a constitutional problem, without much conscious reflection on whether this is a sound practice.
III. THE SOURCE OF NEW DOCTRINES
Avoidance is merely a means by which new constitutional doctrines
may emerge; it is not itself a source of substantive constitutional law.
The phenomenon of generative avoidance naturally leads to the question of where new constitutional doctrines come from. What, for example, is the source of antinovelty? Justice Frankfurter once described how, over a series of opinions and with “progressive
distortion,” a “hint becomes a suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum
and finally elevated to a decision.”224 Avoidance cases are often a step
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
rather than a concern that the statute would have a constitutional problem if read the Government’s way, see id. at 2090.
224 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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in that process, and so they provide a good laboratory to observe the
process in action.
Most investigations of Supreme Court decisionmaking naturally focus on the Justices and their individual predilections, but we want to
offer a few preliminary thoughts about another entity: lawyers. Lawyers have a profound impact on what the Court actually does with a
case. They frame the questions for the Court, decide what and what
not to appeal, and do the bulk of the legal and other research informing a case as they write their briefs. The Court, meanwhile, is quite a
small institution: the substantive legal work of the Court is done by
nine Justices and thirty-six energetic neophytes, their law clerks.225
The Court simply does not have the resources to do a great deal of independent research on each case it decides. That means it will naturally come to rely on the briefing.
NFIB is a terrific example of the impact of lawyering on Supreme
Court decisionmaking. The plaintiffs stressed the novelty of the federal
law at every possible turn. This strategy was deployed more as a constitutional atmospheric than a strict legal argument and mirrored work
done by others in different contexts, such as Salim Hamdan’s challenge
to the Guantanamo tribunals, a case very familiar to one of us that we
discuss below. But in NFIB — when the avoidance canon provided an
opening — the Court elevated the atmospheric into a constitutional
doctrine itself, and one that could have powerful reverberations.
The same basic story — litigation choices shaping constitutional
law in the Supreme Court — is surely behind other big constitutional
cases. For instance, in Griswold v. Connecticut,226 the defendants devoted much of their ninety-six-page brief (written by Professor Thomas Emerson of Yale Law School) to fairly doctrinal arguments that the
Connecticut birth-control proscription was not “reasonably related” to
the “achievement” of a “proper legislative purpose.”227 However, the
defendants also devoted about ten pages to the argument that the
“concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stopped short of certain intrusions into the personal
and intimate life of the citizen,”228 citing the First, Third, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.229 The brief conceded that the Constitution “nowhere refers to a right of privacy in express terms,” but ex–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
225 Each retired Justice also hires a law clerk, who assists the active Justices, so the current
number is actually thirty-nine. There is also a legal office that assists with miscellaneous motions
and certiorari-stage issues, but is generally not involved in the merits cases.
226 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
227 See Brief for Appellants, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496), 1965 WL
115611, at *11–12.
228 Id. at *79.
229 Id. at *79–89. This argument built on Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 542–43, 548–49 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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plained that “various provisions of the Constitution embody separate
aspects of it.”230 That, of course, helped birth the “penumbra” doctrine
in Griswold.231
Constitutional scholarship, which generally focuses on what judges
think and do, has not consciously reflected upon how litigation choices
influence the development of law and doctrine.232 Even when it
has — such as the study of how the NAACP Legal Defense Fund produced Brown v. Board of Education233 or how the Solicitor General
influenced the Burger Court234 — scholars look at big institutional actors that help set the Court’s agenda.235 There are, however, more
subtle impacts waged not by single actors but by far-flung litigants
who may have little in common with (and may indeed even be hostile
toward) each other. For example, when big challenges to federal power — from Guantanamo detentions to the Affordable Care Act —
unite in a common thread of antinovelty, it grows likelier that the atmospheric will slip into doctrine.
We cannot, of course, survey all of this here. This section is more a
stimulant to further research than a polished answer. We think it is
appropriate to consider this issue briefly in an Article devoted primarily to the avoidance canon because the canon provides such a unique
opening for the atmospherics of advocates to migrate into the U.S. Reports. Litigants generally include atmospherics to color a Justice’s
perception of a case with points that are not relevant in a narrowly legal sense. When the Court writes an avoidance decision, however,
those atmospherics can become the hook for the constitutional “doubt”
driving the Court’s reading of the statute.
Our limited goal here is to explore how advocacy and avoidance
combined to give rise to the antinovelty doctrine. To claim that a law
or practice is unprecedented has long been a rhetorical tactic in the arsenal of constitutional litigators.236 Challengers to federal power in the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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231
232

Brief for Appellants, Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (No. 496), 1965 WL 115611, at *79.
381 U.S. at 484.
One interesting though obscure exception is BENJAMIN R. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1942), which traces the impact of the corporate bar on the development of constitutional law in the Lochner era.
233 See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (2004).
234 See, e.g., LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE (1987).
235 See, e.g., Adam Chandler, Cert.-Stage Amicus Briefs: Who Files Them and to What Effect?,
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 27, 2007, 12:31 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/09/cert-stage-amicus
-briefs-who-files-them-and-to-what-effect-2 [http://perma.cc/K6FF-QLA8].
236 The Court observed in 1913: “[I]n almost every instance of the exercise of the [commerce]
power differences are asserted from previous exercises of it and made a ground of attack.” Hoke
v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320 (1913). Justice Ginsburg quoted that statement in her NFIB
dissent and collected other instances of advocates stressing the novelty of challenged laws. 132 S.
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Roberts Court have continued the pattern. For instance, the petitioner’s brief in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld237 begins with a description of the
power that the President had asserted in order to try Hamdan outside
traditional civilian and military judicial systems.238 That opening, and
the rest of the brief, contained five different claims about how President Bush was claiming novel and unprecedented powers.239 These
themes were echoed throughout the thirty-nine amicus briefs and the
oral argument.240
The Solicitor General, on the other side, made repeated arguments
about how the President’s actions were consistent with tradition. Indeed, the opening241 and closing242 lines of his oral argument emphasized that tradition was on his side. Hamdan thus involved dueling
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Ct. 2566, 2625 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
237 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
238 Brief for Petitioner at 5–6, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 53988 (“Such assertions reach far beyond any war power ever conferred upon the Executive, even during declared
wars. . . . In this case, the President seeks not to revive, but to invent, a new form of military jurisdiction. While military commissions have served an important role in times of war, their use
has been strictly limited in light of their inherent threat to liberty and the separation of powers.
Accordingly, this Court has never before recognized the legitimacy of a commission except to the
extent it has been specifically authorized by Congress.”).
239 First, the President was departing from traditional fora for trying crimes — civilian courts
and courts martial. Second, the President was ignoring traditional procedural rules, such as the
right to be present at one’s own trial. Third, the President was using the extraordinary tribunals
for a novel purpose — not to try war crimes, but to try offenses of his own invention. Fourth, the
tribunals were targeted in a novel fashion: whereas past tribunals had applied evenhandedly to
citizens and aliens alike, President Bush’s applied only to aliens. Fifth, the President was taking
the novel step of trying to nullify the role of federal courts by eliminating habeas corpus rights.
Id. at 1–8.
240 Here are the opening lines of the oral argument:
We ask this Court to preserve the status quo to require that the President respect
time-honored limitations on military commissions. These limits, placed in articles 21
and 36 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, require no more than that the President
try offenses that are, indeed, war crimes and to conduct trials according to the minimal
procedural requirements of the UCMJ and the laws of war themselves. These limits do
not represent any change in the way military commissions have historically operated.
Rather, they reflect Congress’s authority under the Define and Punish Clause to codify
limits on commissions, limits that this Court has historically enforced to avoid presidential blank checks.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), http://www.supremecourt
.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-184.pdf [http://perma.cc/SD7V-CXHU].
241 Id. at 36 (“The executive branch has long exercised the authority to try enemy combatants
by military commissions. That authority was part and parcel of George Washington’s authority
as Commander in Chief of the Revolutionary Forces, as dramatically illustrated by the case of
Major Andre. And that authority was incorporated into the Constitution.”).
242 Id. at 79 (“The use of military commissions to try enemy combatants has been part and parcel of the war power for 200 years. Congress recognized it in 1916 in the Articles of War, then
again, after World War II, in the UCMJ. This Court recognized it in a host of cases, not just
Quirin, but Yamashita, Eisentrager, and, most clearly, in Madsen. Since that is such an important
component of the law of war, something that has been part and parcel of that power from Major
Andre’s capture to today, there is no reason for this Court to depart from that tradition.”).
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claims about which side’s arguments — the detainee’s or the government’s — were, in fact, unprecedented. In that way, both litigants
were advancing a subtle, implicit claim about novelty: the defenders of
tradition had the Constitution on their side; those who were trying to
alter the status quo did not.
The Court did not adopt an antinovelty doctrine in Hamdan. It
used history just as the litigants had — as an atmospheric. The Court
began the merits section of its opinion by surveying past military
commissions in the Revolutionary War, the Civil War, the MexicanAmerican War, and World War II.243 But all of those forerunners differed in important ways from Hamdan’s tribunal — a fact the Court
mentioned repeatedly without ever quite saying that this novelty made
the tribunal particularly suspect. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence likewise focused on how time-tested standards would, in general, have
greater fidelity to the Constitution.244
We have already discussed Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which concerned double for-cause
protection. The petitioners’ brief in that case — that is, the brief challenging the constitutionality of the double for-cause arrangement —
emphasized the supposed novelty of that arrangement several times.245
For instance: “The Act’s gratuitous and unprecedented effort to immunize government power from public accountability, by creating a
‘Fifth Branch’ of government neither appointed nor removable by the
President . . . violates every basic precept of separated powers.”246
The amicus curiae briefs contained similar claims: “[I]n its degree of
insulation from presidential oversight and control, the Board is alone
among all other agencies, past or present.”247 These claims about the
supposed lack of precedent for the Board did not have substantive,
doctrinal relevance to the constitutional arguments; again, they were
included as atmospherics.
And that is how the Chief Justice’s opinion, striking down the double for-cause arrangement, used them. The opinion stated that the
parties had “identified only a handful of isolated positions in which inferior officers might be protected by two levels of good-cause ten–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
243
244

548 U.S. at 590–92.
Id. at 637 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part) (“Respect for laws derived from the customary
operation of the Executive and Legislative Branches gives some assurance of stability in time of
crisis. The Constitution is best preserved by reliance on standards tested over time and insulated
from the pressures of the moment.”).
245 The brief was authored by three experienced Supreme Court litigators — Michael Carvin
(of Jones Day), Viet Dinh (of Bancroft), and Kenneth Starr.
246 Brief for Petitioners at 10, Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S.
Ct. 3138 (2010) (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2247130.
247 Brief for the Cato Institute et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Free Enter.
Fund, 130 S. Ct. 3138 (No. 08-861), 2009 WL 2406376.
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ure,”248 and then quoted Judge Kavanaugh’s dissent from the decision
under review: “Perhaps the most telling indication of the severe constitutional problem with the [Board] is the lack of historical precedent for
this entity.”249 The Chief Justice’s opinion discussed the novelty of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board in the section responding to counterarguments, after the bulk of the constitutional analysis
was done. Nothing important turned on it; its placement suggested
that it was only rhetorical dressing.
Then, a few years later, the challengers to the Affordable Care Act
launched a barrage of novelty-based arguments at the Court. In the
main brief challenging the individual mandate, the antinovelty rhetoric
began in the first full entry of the Table of Contents: “Congress’ powers are limited and enumerated to protect individual liberty, which is
threatened by the Act’s unprecedented purchase mandate.”250 The
very first page of the brief claimed: “Never before has Congress enacted such a regulatory mandate.”251 The first sentence of the “Summary
of the Argument” section was: “The mandate imposes an extraordinary
and unprecedented duty on Americans to enter into costly private contracts.”252 The first sentence of the challengers’ oral argument was:
“The mandate represents an unprecedented effort by Congress to compel individuals to enter commerce in order to better regulate commerce.”253 The dozens of amici echoed these claims.254
Given this relentless emphasis in the briefing, it is no surprise that
the fact of the individual mandate’s supposed novelty showed up in
the Chief Justice’s opinion (right near the beginning of his Commerce
Clause analysis) and the joint dissent. But the antinovelty idea did not
play a subordinate or merely rhetorical role in the Chief Justice’s opinion. To the contrary, it was woven into the opinion’s logical structure.
The “hint” in Hamdan became a “suggestion” in Free Enterprise Fund
that was “elevated to a decision” in NFIB.255 The antinovelty doctrine
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
248
249

Free Enter. Fund, 130 S. Ct. at 3159.
Id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 699
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
250 Brief for Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate at iii, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398), 2012 WL 379586 (capitalization removed).
251 Id. at 1.
252 Id. at 7.
253 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 140, at 55.
254 See, e.g., Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation and Constitutional Law Scholars as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents (Individual Mandate Issue) at 32, NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(No. 11-398), 2012 WL 1680857. It is also no surprise that one account of the health care law and
subsequent litigation is entitled Unprecedented. JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE (2013).
255 Cf. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (decrying
the Court’s “progressive distortion” of search-and-seizure doctrine post–Weeks v. United States,
232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
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birthed in the health care litigation is thus an example of a heretofore
unnoticed mode of constitutional change: rhetorical points, backed by
language in the case law, put forward by sophisticated Supreme Court
litigants, transforming into constitutional doctrine. This pattern will
only grow in importance with the appearance of a specialized Supreme
Court bar.
As we said at the outset, that phenomenon, as a whole, is beyond
the scope of this Article. But it is linked to the avoidance canon because the canon provides a unique opening for new doctrines to appear. The constitutional analysis in an avoidance opinion receives less
attention and rigor, and the Court may be emboldened to signal
change when it does not have to face the consequence of that change.
The Roberts Court has ushered in some important constitutional
changes. Merits aside, it is important to understand and assess, from a
process perspective, how that change has been achieved.
IV. CODA: “THE CANDID SERVICE OF AVOIDANCE”
We have, so far, been mostly critical of the avoidance canon. But it
is not irredeemable — we think it should be limited, not jettisoned.
And the typology of avoidance we laid out in Part I can help to distinguish the good from the bad. Where, after consulting all relevant materials, two readings of a statute are in equipoise, and one reading
would raise serious doubts under some long-settled principle of constitutional law, no one would seriously contest that a judge should opt for
the doubt-free reading. That is, of course, a stylized and unrealistic
scenario. In practice, these variables will operate along sliding scales:
the level of doubt and level of distortion will vary. Substantial doubt
may justify a more significant distortion, less doubt may justify a less
significant distortion, little doubt will not justify a major distortion,
and so on.
It would be impossible to calibrate these sliding scales precisely in
the abstract. Like any hard judicial task, the avoidance canon is not
reducible to some mechanistic or algorithmic solution. But the distinctions and examples set out in this Article may at least yield some helpful suggestions. We have critiqued two varieties of avoidance in particular: generative avoidance, which uses the canon to articulate new
constitutional doctrines, and the rewriting power, which embraces implausible readings of statutes in the misguided pursuit of judicial modesty. Of course, any responsible use of avoidance will have to avoid
those pitfalls. A court should not swerve too far from the best reading
of the statute because the systemic costs to democratic decisionmaking
are too high, and it cannot create new constitutional law because the
basic conditions ensuring the soundness of that law are not present.
Beyond that, we (along with several other scholars) think that the
avoidance canon is most valuable to give life to underenforced consti-
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tutional norms.256 We use that term in a precise sense. Certain constitutional rights may be settled but difficult to implement because of institutional limitations of the judiciary. The “slippage” between “a constitutional norm and its enforcement” in court leads to an
“underenforced” norm.257 The constitutional principle at issue may
involve intractable line-drawing problems, or it may resist crystallization as workable legal doctrine. Whatever the exact cause, the important point is that the principle is “truncated for reasons which are
based not upon analysis of the constitutional concept but upon various
concerns of the Court about its institutional role.”258
Norms that are underenforced in this manner should still “be understood to be legally valid to their full conceptual limits.”259 And one
consequence of that proposition is that courts are justified in extending
their enforcement of those norms to the extent that doing so is consistent with the institutional considerations that caused the norms to
be underenforced in the first place. That conclusion brings us back to
the avoidance canon. The avoidance canon is a valuable method to
allow for some judicial enforcement of constitutional norms in the
space between a norm’s “full conceptual limits” and the level of direct
judicial enforcement it receives. The canon can thus breathe life into
an underenforced constitutional concept.260 But because the decision
is subject to a congressional override, the decision ultimately leaves the
hard line-drawing and enforcement problems to the branch best suited
to resolve them.261
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
256 See generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212 (1978). A number of scholars have defended the avoidance canon on a similar ground. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 286 (1994); Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The
Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early
Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 397, 455–59 (2005); Young, supra note 78, at 1602–13.
257 Sager, supra note 256, at 1213 (internal quotation marks omitted).
258 Id. at 1214.
259 Id. at 1221.
260 Because of our definition of an “underenforced norm,” this use of avoidance does not run
into the “penumbra” problem identified by Judge Posner. See Posner, supra note 77.
261 Professor Eskridge has noted that the “reasons for the nonenforcement” of constitutional
norms through judicial review may be “equally valid arguments for the nonenforcement of [those]
norms through statutory interpretation.” ESKRIDGE, supra note 256, at 288. That is a reason for
caution before enforcing any norm through avoidance. But we think there are situations where
the reasons for nonenforcement though judicial review would not be “equally valid” in the avoidance context. For instance, constitutional cases often involve some sort of balancing at their core.
In Equal Protection or First Amendment cases, courts must balance some classification or speech
restriction against a government interest. The institutional limitation that leads to underenforcement of a right in such a case may relate to a court’s relative inability to gather all the information relevant to the balancing. And it may be that a court, after reviewing the information
available to it, believes that the balance tips in favor of the right-holder but is cognizant that with
perfect information the balance might tip the other way. In that sort of case, avoidance seems like
a responsible mode of enforcement. The legislature, with presumably superior informational re-
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We explore this justification for avoidance through the First
Amendment. It may be clear that a particular statute implicates the
First Amendment, but difficult in a given case for a court to balance
the constitutional and governmental interests at stake. In that setting,
the avoidance canon can perform an “invaluable” function as a “means
to mediate the borderline between statutory interpretation and constitutional law, and between the judicial and legislative roles, where judicial line-drawing is especially difficult and where underenforced constitutional values are at stake.”262 A good example is the early Warren
Court’s use of avoidance — led by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan —
in First Amendment cases about political subversion and communism.
For instance, in United States v. Rumely,263 the Court considered
Congress’s power to investigate someone who sold what Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion elliptically described as “books of a particular
political tendentiousness” — that is, books with Communist leanings.264 That power was defined by a congressional resolution, which
authorized the relevant House Committee to investigate “lobbying activities.”265 Rather than “delimiting the protection guaranteed by the
First Amendment,”266 as Justices Black and Douglas called for in concurrence,267 the Court, “in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt,” interpreted the resolution not to cover books intended to influence the thinking of the community, but only representations
made directly to Congress.268
That use of avoidance was entirely appropriate. For one thing,
judges are instinctively hesitant to issue decisions that could affect national security (such as a decision that would strengthen the influence
of Communism in the 1950s). There are prudential reasons to tread
lightly. But that means that the potential for underenforcement of
constitutional rights is high, and the avoidance canon can provide a
way to enforce a constitutional provision to its conceptual limits, without entirely ignoring the prudential reasons for caution in cases implicating national security. The likelihood that Congress will respond to
a Court decision it disagrees with is much higher when national securi–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
sources, can revisit and restrike the balance in response to the court’s decision, if the political will
exists. And that process itself may generate a record to facilitate judicial review in the future.
See generally Matthew C. Stephenson, The Price of Public Action: Constitutional Doctrine and
the Judicial Manipulation of Legislative Enactment Costs, 118 YALE L.J. 2 (2008) (arguing that
courts can “craft doctrines” to manipulate congressional action instead of “attempting to designate
certain government actions . . . as permissible or impermissible,” id. at 4).
262 Frickey, supra note 256, at 402.
263 345 U.S. 41 (1953). The case is discussed in Frickey, supra note 256, at 413–17.
264 Rumely, 345 U.S. at 42.
265 H.R. Res. 298, 81st Cong. (1949).
266 Rumely, 345 U.S. at 48.
267 Id. at 56–58 (Douglas, J., concurring).
268 Id. at 47 (majority opinion).
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ty is threatened, as the dialogue between the Court and Congress over
the rights of Guantanamo detainees has demonstrated.269
In addition, the Court was not breaking new legal ground. The use
of avoidance in Rumely was not generative, as it was in Northwest
Austin or NFIB. “Surely it cannot be denied,” the Court understatedly
explained, that the congressional resolution at issue — which, according to the Government, gave Congress “the power to inquire into all
efforts of private individuals to influence public opinion through books
and periodicals” — raised “doubts” under the First Amendment.270
Finally, the Court’s interpretation of the statute was “not barred by intellectual honesty.”271 Rather, the Court observed, to give the resolution “a more restricted scope” did no “violence” to it.272 The combination of these three factors — the difficulty of balancing First
Amendment concerns against national security, the relative consensus
regarding the underlying constitutional principles, and the lack of violence done to the statute — made this case a particularly suitable instance of avoidance.273
The rule of lenity operates in a similar manner. The rule of lenity
“requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants subjected to them.”274 The rule of lenity is rooted in constitutional considerations, and so can be regarded as a particular species in
the avoidance genre.275 To construe a statute narrowly alleviates fairnotice and void-for-vagueness concerns that might afflict an imprecise
criminal statute. Lenity is generally a good use of avoidance for two
reasons: First, it does not involve the creation of new doctrines of constitutional law; rather, it instantiates settled constitutional values that
are rarely enforced directly. Second, the Court takes seriously the limits on its applicability. There has to be a “grievous ambiguity” in the
statute.276 As the Court has explained, “[t]he simple existence of some
statutory ambiguity . . . is not sufficient to warrant application of that
rule, for most statutes are ambiguous to some degree.”277 “The rule of
lenity applies only if, ‘after seizing everything from which aid can be
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
269
270
271
272
273

See BREYER, supra note 222, at 194–214.
Rumely, 345 U.S. at 46 (emphasis added).
Id. at 47.
Id.
See Robert Post, Festschrift, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319, 1321–23 (2010) (defending the “statesmanship”
of these Warren Court decisions because “[j]udicial decision making is always enveloped within a
larger political context that endows judicial work with legitimacy and effectiveness,” id. at 1322).
274 United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
275 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement
Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 600 (1992).
276 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139 (1998) (quoting Staples v. United States, 511
U.S. 600, 619 n.17 (1994)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
277 Id. at 138.
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derived,’”278 the Court “can make ‘no more than a guess as to what
Congress intended.’”279
In the end, our prescription is intuitive and pragmatic. First, judges should take seriously the threshold limits on the avoidance canon’s
applicability. The statutory reading embraced by the judge must be,
as Justice Holmes put it, “fairly possible,” and the constitutional doubt
(in the absence of avoidance) must be “grave.”280 Though the showing
required by the rule of lenity (“grievous ambiguity”281) may be too demanding for the avoidance context, lenity at least shows that it is possible to be vigilant about whether a canon-colored reading is in fact
plausible. Justices Frankfurter and Black — who had different judicial temperaments, to put it mildly — agreed in one case that the
avoidance canon should “not be pressed to the point of disingenuous
evasion,”282 and that a judge should not “rewrite [a] statute in the
name of avoiding decision of constitutional questions.”283 We have explained why: the rewritten statute is sticky and may prove a more serious interference with lawmaking in the democratic branches than invalidation. In the end, there is no magic formula that captures how
far a judge can swerve from the best reading of a statute in the name
of avoidance. The current doctrinal standard — that a reading must
be “fairly possible” — is probably the best that can be done, even if it
is rather tautological. Our goal here is simply to draw attention to the
costs of statutory rewriting, and to insist that courts be sensitive to
these costs in determining whether a canon-colored reading meets the
standard.
Second, judges should not articulate new constitutional norms
while purporting to avoid constitutional issues. The likelihood of constitutional analysis that is cursory, obscure, or wrong is too high. If the
Court does something new in constitutional law, it owes it to lower
courts and the political branches to define the new doctrine clearly and
to defend the new doctrine rigorously. That is normally required by
the very structure of our judicial system — the case-or-controversy requirement, the fusion of rationale and judgment. But the avoidance
canon allows a judge to defer the true ramifications of her ruling.
The other side of the same coin is that judges should be scrupulous
not to regard any constitutional discussion in a modern avoidance de–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
278 Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 65 (1995) (quoting Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 239
(1993)).
279 Id. (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178 (1958)).
280 United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 241 U.S. 394, 401 (1916).
281 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 139 (emphasis added).
282 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 799 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)).
283 Id. at 785 (Black, J., dissenting).
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cision as binding precedent in a future case. Avoidance is rooted in
Ashwander and the desire to avoid making new constitutional law. A
court is unfaithful to that purpose when it treats the constitutional discussion in an avoidance decision as precedential.284
We recognize, of course, that there will be hard borderline cases —
interpretations that push the boundary of what is “fairly possible” and
extensions of old doctrines that hover between application and innovation. Like all hard cases, those will require judgment. Our hope is only to inform the exercise of that judgment, and to resist the uncritical
assumption that avoidance is always preferable.
CONCLUSION
The Court generally defends the avoidance canon as a species of
judicial restraint. But the only thing the avoidance canon “avoids”
is the invalidation of a statute. Recent history makes clear that the
avoidance canon does not avoid a constitutional decision; it is, rather,
a tool of constitutional decisionmaking. When a court considers a constitutional challenge to a statute, the choice it faces is not whether
to “avoid” or “engage in” constitutional adjudication; the choice
is which form of constitutional adjudication is more suitable in the
circumstances.
We have tried to identify the most important circumstances informing that choice. First, the rewriting power — where avoidance is embraced even though the resulting statutory interpretation is implausible — is dangerous because, like judicial review itself, it is
countermajoritarian. Indeed it may even be more countermajoritarian
than simply striking down a statute: at least invalidation leaves behind
a blank slate upon which Congress may put in place its own solution.
Avoidance may put in place a court-crafted solution that never had
and never will have the support of Congress, and that may never be
revisited because of the structural inertia laced into our constitutional
design. Second, generative avoidance — uses of the avoidance canon
that result in new constitutional doctrine or significant innovations in
constitutional doctrine — is problematic because it unmoors adjudication from the traditional, structural source of judicial restraint. That
source of restraint, embodied in the Article III case-or-controversy requirement, is the fusion of rationale and judgment. That fusion generally means constitutional principles develop in a context where their
impact is immediate and apparent.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
284 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2637 n.3 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Acknowledging the existence of ‘serious constitutional questions’ does not suggest how those questions should be answered.” (quoting id. at 2630 (majority opinion))).
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Northwest Austin suffered from both these flaws. The Court rewrote the bailout provision of the Voting Rights Act while unleashing
a novel constitutional doctrine that eviscerated the same Act only a
few years later. But the arrival of that new doctrine was shrouded in
restraint because the Court, after all, had “avoided” striking down a
law, at least for a time.
The avoidance canon should not be discarded, but it should be circumscribed. There are circumstances where the avoidance canon
makes sense and does indeed function as a useful principle of restraint.
In particular, it can be useful as a mode of enforcing underenforced
constitutional norms. In that circumstance, the canon does not expand
a constitutional principle beyond its conceptual limits and respects the
institutional limits that caused the norm to be underenforced in the
first place. But there are also circumstances where judges must be
wary of embracing the easy but specious restraint promised by the
avoidance canon, when the more restrained and responsible exercise of
judicial power is just to face the hard task of deciding a constitutional
question.
These suggestions are offered as invitations as much as final answers. The avoidance canon is, by now, such a deeply embedded practice in the federal courts that it will never be totally abandoned. Nor
should it. But there are varieties that are particularly problematic,
and those should be eradicated even if the practice more generally is
not. Because of this variety, courts should reflect more consciously
on when avoidance is actually the more responsible and restrained
course. This Article aims to stimulate that sort of reflection. Given
how routine and reflexive invocations of avoidance have become in the
biggest constitutional cases confronting the Court, we think this project is important.

